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ABSTRACT 
 
CLYDE HOSEA RAY IV: John Marshall’s Constitutionalism  
(Under the direction of Michael Lienesch) 
 
Although often cited for his formidable role in shaping early American 
jurisprudence, John Marshall is seldom conceived as a political thinker. This dissertation 
provides insight into this neglected dimension of Marshall’s thought by examining his 
constitutional theory in the context of three of his most important Supreme Court 
opinions: Marbury v. Madison (1801), McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), and Ogden v. 
Saunders (1827). While many scholars have viewed Marshall’s thought in exclusively 
partisan or legal terms, this interpretation draws attention to Marshall as a constitutional 
theorist concerned with the Constitution’s basic moral legitimacy; its sovereignty over 
national and state government policy; and its ability to instill habits of democratic 
citizenship. I argue that these commitments illustrate Marshall’s commitment to the 
Constitution as a source of national identity during the early-nineteenth century. In light 
of this recovery of Marshall’s political thought, I contend that Marshall’s 
constitutionalism makes critical contributions to our understanding of the creation of the 
American nation as well as debates concerning constitutional authority in the present day. 
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Introduction: John Marshall and the American Constitution 
 Seated on the ground floor of the United States Supreme Court, the oversized 
statue of Chief Justice John Marshall greets all visitors as a perpetual reminder of the 
man whose opinions and career most shaped the national judiciary. Over two hundred 
years since it was recorded, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ claim continues to ring true: 
“If American law were to be represented by a single figure, sceptic and worshipper alike 
would agree without dispute that the figure could be one alone, and that one, John 
Marshall.”1 So we have been told, and so we believe. Yet in spite of the prominence of 
his legacy in American legal discourse, Marshall’s political thought remains a subject of 
surprisingly little scholarly attention. To some extent, the reason for this neglect is easily 
understood. Marshall’s opinions addressed timely political controversies rather than 
timeless principles of political theory. Moreover, he was a judge, not a political 
philosopher: most of the hundreds of opinions he wrote pointedly avoided the abstract 
speculation and high philosophy that we find in the writings of contemporaries such as 
James Madison and Thomas Jefferson.2 Nevertheless, his writings were inevitably both 
                                                 
 1Oliver Wendell Holmes, Collected Legal Papers (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and 
Howe, 1920), 270. 
 
 2As Samuel Konefsky notes, “Marshall himself denied that his political philosophy was 
the product of deliberate reflection or contemplation,” instead attributing its emergence to the 
“casual circumstances” of the American Revolution rather than careful judgment. See his John 
Marshall and Alexander Hamilton (New York: Macmillan, 1964), 254. 
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political and theoretical, and he deserves to be considered an important contributor to the 
history of American political thought.  
 Over the years both Marshall and the volumes of opinions he left behind have 
been the subject of much scholarship. Interpretations of Marshall vary widely, from the 
hagiographic to the cynical. Some have painted his life in grand and sweeping strokes, 
portraying his career as one of almost mythic accomplishment. Among the most famous 
of such accounts is Albert Beveridge’s multi-volume Life of John Marshall, which 
portrays Marshall in a highly sympathetic light as a legal and political giant during his 
own lifetime and a national hero after his death. These admiring interpretations have 
emphasized his decisive contribution in securing individual rights and legitimizing 
national power, as well as his statesmanship in deliberately eschewing the narrow 
political squabbles of his day. For such authors, Marshall was “the Great Chief Justice,” 
the Constitution’s most stalwart defender.3 As one admiring biographer recently 
concluded, “Above all, Marshall’s Court gave the American people—‘We the people’—a 
means of redress against tyranny by federal, state, and local government.”4     
 Other scholars have taken a more critical view of Marshall, often by situating him 
as a central player in early party politics. For these authors, Marshall was the Federalist 
par excellence, who used his position on the Supreme Court as a means for promoting 
                                                 
 3See, for example, Charles F. Hobson, The Great Chief Justice: John Marshall and the 
Rule of Law (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1996), 164-170, 171-174, 177-178; Jean 
Edward Smith, John Marshall: Definer of a Nation (New York: Henry Holt, 1996), 488-89; and 
R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court (Baton Rouge, LA: 
Louisiana State University Press, 2001), 414-458. 
 
 4Harlow Giles Unger, John Marshall: The Chief Justice Who Saved The Nation 
(Philadelphia: De Capo Press, 2014), 321.  
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and defending the party’s policies. In these interpretations, Thomas Jefferson’s devotion 
to decentralized authority and popular sovereignty met its match in Marshall, whose more 
subtle loyalties to the Federalist Party consistently led him to endorse strong central 
authority and separation of powers.5 Look past his pretensions of upholding the 
Constitution, these authors argue, and one will see the authentic Marshall: the “ardent 
Federalist,” loyal to the end to Washington, Adams, and the strong national government 
they championed.6 
  A different approach has been to emphasize the legal as opposed to political 
impact of Marshall’s thought. Here again scholars differ widely. For some, Marshall’s 
chief contributions to legal theory are his fidelity to the rule of law and the words of the 
Constitution. His entire body of work, summarizes William Draper Lewis, shows “that he 
adhered closely to the words of the Constitution.” Indeed, in a practical if not historical 
sense, “Marshall was the strictest of strict constructionists; and as a necessary result, his 
opinions are practically devoid of theories of government, sovereignty, and the rights of 
man.”7 By contrast, others have drawn different conclusions, arguing that he expanded 
the power of the federal judiciary far beyond the limits set by the Constitution.8 These 
                                                 
 5Lawrence Goldstone, The Activist: John Marshall, Marbury v. Madison, and the Myth of 
Judicial Review (New York: Walker and Company, 2008), 7. 
 
 6Robert H. Bork, Coercing Virtue (Washington: AEI Press, 2003), 55. 
 
 7William Draper Lewis, Great American Lawyers, (Philadelphia: John Winston Co., 
1907) 2: 378. 
 
 8Karen Orren and Christopher Walker, for example, have recently shown how Marshall’s 
decision in Marbury v. Madison elevated the province of judicial jurisdiction above other political 
concerns implicit in the case. See their “Cold Case File: Indictable Acts and Officer 
Accountability in Marbury v. Madison,” American Political Science Review 107.2 (2013), 241-
258. For other studies of Marshall’s use of judicial review comparing his practice to modern 
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more critical appraisals point to opinions such as McCulloch v. Maryland, which one 
recent scholar has cast as a case study of Marshall’s “aggressive nationalism.”9 Yet one 
thing most of these interpretations agree: that Marshall was the first in a long line of 
thinkers who defined the character of American constitutional law. As renowned justice 
Benjamin Cardozo declared, Marshall “gave to the constitution of the United States the 
impress of his own mind; and the form of our constitutional law is what it is, because he 
moulded it … in the fire of his own intense convictions.”10 
 Finally, for the few who have viewed Marshall through a philosophical lens, his 
thought has been a matter of controversy, with some seeing it as tied to classical 
republicanism, while others view it as representative of the Lockean influence on the 
American founders. Morton Frisch, for instance, sees a nascent “constitutional 
republicanism” in Marshall’s Supreme Court decisions, while Robert Faulkner locates 
Marshall’s emphasis on the protection of individual liberty and property rights squarely 
within the libertarian-Lockean framework.11 Other Marshall scholars such as Richard 
                                                 
applications, see Leslie Friedman Goldstein, “Popular Sovereignty, the Origins of Judicial 
Review, and the Revival of Unwritten Law,” Journal of Politics 48.1 (1986), 51-71; Robert 
Lawry Clinton, Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review (Lawrence, KS: University Press of 
Kansas, 1989); and Sylvia Snowiss, Judicial Review and the Law of the Constitution (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990). 
 
 9See the title of Richard Ellis’ recent book, Aggressive Nationalism: McCulloch v. 
Maryland and the Foundation of Federal Authority in the Young Republic (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007). More even-handed but nonetheless nationalist interpretations of 
Marshall’s thought include Edward S. Corwin, John Marshall and the Constitution (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1919); Leonard Baker, John Marshall: A Life in Law (New York: 
Macmillan, 1974); Francis N. Stites, John Marshall: Defender of the Constitution (Boston, MA: 
Little Brown, 1981); and Mark R. Killenbeck, McCulloch v. Maryland: Securing a Nation 
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2006). 
 
 10Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1921), 169. 
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Brisben have questioned the conceptual utility of either classical republicanism or 
liberalism as a means for appraising Marshall’s thought, instead arguing that “[h]e was an 
individual whose values reflect the transition from republicanism to liberalism.”12  
 This analysis examines Marshall’s political thought in three Supreme Court cases 
through the lens of constitutional legitimacy, sovereignty, and republican citizenship. 
Marbury v. Madison illustrates Marshall’s understanding of the basis of the 
Constitution’s legal and political legitimacy, its moral authority as fundamental law. 
McCulloch v. Maryland sheds light on his view of constitutional sovereignty, and the 
superiority of the law of the Constitution relative to national and state legislation. And 
Ogden v. Saunders provides a venue for his understanding of the duties of citizenship and 
the meaning of liberty in the emerging commercial republic of the nineteenth century. Of 
the over five-hundred opinions Marshall authored in his time as Chief Justice, these three 
opinions together bring to light the core components of his political thought: his belief in 
the Constitution’s fundamental moral legitimacy, its purpose in mediating authority 
relations between the national government and the states, and its promotion of a modern 
neo-republican form of liberty. Although over time these opinions have become tied to 
different legacies, a major part of the work of this analysis is to peel back the 
                                                 
 11See Robert K. Faulkner, John Marshall’s Jurisprudence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1968), 3-44 and Morton Frisch, “John Marshall’s Philosophy of Constitutional 
Republicanism,” Review of Politics 20.1 (1958), 34-45. On Marshall’s republicanism and 
pragmatist leanings, see also Thomas C. Shevory, “John Marshall as Republican: Order and 
Conflict in American Political History,” in John Marshall’s Achievement: Law, Politics, and 
Constitutional Interpretation, ed. Thomas C. Shevory (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), 75-
93. 
 
 12Richard A. Brisben, “John Marshall and the Nature of Law in the Early Republic,” The 
Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 98.1 (1990), 57-80: 62.  
 
 6 
 
conventional wisdom concerning these cases to arrive at a fresh understanding of 
Marshall’s political thought, a perspective removed from the typical filters applied to 
Marshall’s opinions.     
 The first chapter focuses on one of Marshall’s most celebrated opinions in the 
case of Marbury v. Madison. Although scholars have typically approached the opinion 
from the perspective of judicial review, this analysis views the case through the lens of 
constitutional legitimacy. The chapter argues that Marshall looked to a variety of familiar 
traditions in order to justify the binding authority of the Constitution, including the 
document’s protection of rights, its representation of popular sovereignty, and its 
instrumental value in settling political questions. Moving beyond these themes, however, 
the chapter argues that Marshall offers a unique theory of the Constitution’s moral 
legitimacy that is derived from its embodiment of principles of good government and its 
status as the only viable legal order available to the nation.  Hence, Marbury provides 
more than an argument on behalf of judicial supremacy. Marshall’s opinion also brings 
together contemporary accounts of constitutional legitimacy, while also illustrating 
Marshall’s own theory of constitutional obedience. 
 Chapter two turns to McCulloch v. Maryland, drawing on Marshall’s opinion in 
the case as well as a series of Virginia newspaper essays he penned anonymously in the 
aftermath of the Court’s decision to explore his view of the Constitution’s sovereignty. 
While scholars are typically divided on the question of whether McCulloch advocates 
national sovereignty or federalism, this chapter contends that Marshall rests ultimate 
sovereignty in the Constitution itself. Moreover, his commitment to constitutional 
sovereignty is brought into sharper relief in his editorial exchanges with states’ rights 
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advocate Spencer Roane. The logic of states’ rights troubled Marshall, and he did not shy 
from pointing out its flaws. Writing as “A Friend to the Constitution,” Marshall defends 
the Constitution as the final legal authority superior to the political branches as well as 
the state governments. In this rare excursion into the realm of public opinion, Marshall 
set forth an account of sovereignty intended to defeat theories that would render the 
Constitution as mere league between the states or identify its rule with a consolidated 
national government. By situating these essays alongside the Court’s official opinion in 
McCulloch, one achieves a more comprehensive assessment of Marshall’s 
constitutionalism and the limits he imposed upon national and state authority alike. 
 Chapter three examines Marshall’s lone dissent as Chief Justice on a 
constitutional question in the case of Ogden v. Saunders. For Marshall, a seemingly 
innocuous New York bankruptcy act was a symbol for a nation that was increasingly 
neglecting the law of the Constitution. While his fellow justices had upheld the act 
permitting state interference in the terms of contracts governing default, Marshall argued 
that the legislation was not only incompatible with the Constitution’s contract clause, but 
also undermined core aspects of the classical liberal and republican traditions that most 
Americans took for granted. But of even greater significance, Marshall’s dissent also 
presents a neo-republican theory of non-domination that reconciled individual rights with 
the common good. This fragile partnership of concepts was jeopardized by the prospect 
of arbitrary political power. Here the greatest threat posed by the act was not its 
disruption of the national economy, but the specter of state legislatures invading the 
liberties and private agreements reached by citizens. In Ogden, Marshall presents the 
Constitution as the only barrier against such invasions, and declares that it is among the 
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powers of the Supreme Court to preserve the document’s authority from “legislative 
infraction.” The dissent is significant in its defense of the political theory undergirding 
the Constitution, a theory including elements of classical liberalism and republicanism 
but also embracing a modern version of republican liberty that was possible only under 
the rule of law. 
 Together these chapters illustrate that Marshall was not only guided by rules of 
legal interpretation, nor was he merely promulgating a veiled partisan agenda from the 
bench. On the contrary, the opinions examined here reveal a complex political thinker, 
whose convictions were anchored in the Constitution, not the national government or the 
Federalist Party. Marshall used the occasions examined here to develop and put forward a 
complex constitutionalism that was sensitive to the permanent ideas of political theory: 
the basis for obedience to national law in Marbury; the nexus of national and state 
sovereignty in McCulloch; and the tensions between individual liberty and the common 
good in Ogden. Taking full measure of John Marshall’s political thought means dwelling 
on each of these aspects, for in doing so, one appreciates his opinions as not simply 
justifications of legal decisions, but as arguments on behalf of a political theory of the 
Constitution and its guiding role in national affairs.  
 At the heart of this constitutional theory was Marshall’s commitment to the 
Constitution as the foundation of America’s legal and political life. An unabashed 
supporter of the Constitution in the Virginia Ratifying Convention, Marshall believed the 
Constitution was “the greatest improvement on human institutions.” Yet clearly the 
Constitution was never just a “splendid bauble” designed for admiration but possessing 
little practical value. Its instrumental function could not be exaggerated for a nation 
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coping with its newfound responsibilities in the commercial and international arena. For 
him, the document was principled and timeless, while also practical and flexible. As he 
famously put it, the Constitution was “intended to endure for ages to come, and, 
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.” A government 
invested with “ample powers” to fulfill the prosperity and happiness of the nation 
required by extension “ample means for their execution.” Thus Marshall was not only 
upholding the Constitution, but also explaining the rule of law to an audience still 
uncertain and in some cases skeptical of the framers’ achievement. To paraphrase one of 
his most famous maxims, Marshall never let the nation forget that it was a Constitution 
he was expounding. 
 Marshall’s political thought extends well beyond the founding era. In fact, it has 
much to say to constitutional theory today. Perhaps the biggest intervention of his thought 
is in contemporary debates concerning national identity and the instrumental function of 
constitutions in cultivating such membership. Marshall’s work speaks directly to this role 
of constitutions in unifying groups of people or states that share territory but lack a 
common history, what Jürgen Habermas has called “constitutional patriotism.”13 Such 
theories emphasize the acceptance of the rule of law as embodied in a constitution as a 
“form of civic, non-national” identity for individuals in multicultural societies.14 In 
                                                 
 13See his Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Democracy 
(Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1997), 499. See also Jan-Werner Müller, “A European 
Constitutional Patriotism? The Case Restated,” European Law Journal 14.5 (2008), 542-557. 
 
 14See Jan-Werner Müller, Constitutional Patriotism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2007), 2. Nor is the attractiveness of such theories limited to the developing world or 
ethnically-divided societies. Müller suggests that even “established democracies” such as the 
United States may require some sort of “civic minimum” as a “focal point of democratic loyalty” 
in order for political institutions to function effectively (5). 
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examining Marshall’s opinions, a distinctive conception of the Constitution emerges that 
sought unity amid disparate political loyalties, states, and local economies in the early 
nineteenth century. As Chief Justice, he was well-situated for crafting and instilling a 
national identity based on a shared veneration for the Constitution. At a time when 
fragmentation along political and social lines runs deep in the United States as well as 
abroad, Marshall’s constitutionalism is instructive for understanding the influence of a 
constitution as a source of shared meaning and common political vocabulary. 
 Citizens have and will continue to debate the basic political questions raised in in 
the cases explored here. Why do we continue to obey a Constitution over the course of 
several generations? How much political authority should the national government 
possess? What obligations, if any, does citizenship entail? Marshall’s work addresses 
each of these disputes, while pointing up a key question about the Constitution itself: to 
what extent can a written document generate national identity and unity in addition to its 
function in creating a legal order? Few would question Marshall’s influence in his time. 
The following pages show the lessons he imparts to our own.  
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Chapter One 
 
John Marshall, Marbury v. Madison, and the Construction of Constitutional 
Legitimacy 
 Perhaps no other Supreme Court decision has offered a more lucid and forceful 
defense of the Constitution than Marbury v. Madison (1803). There are several 
explanations for the case’s prominence in American legal history, including the Court’s 
defense of the vested rights of individuals, its formulation of the “political questions” 
doctrine, and its assertion of judicial supremacy. In most accounts, the opinion’s 
articulation of the principle of judicial review continues to loom particularly large.15 All 
of these factors were indeed important in shaping the future course of the nation, and they 
                                                 
 15For recent studies of the long-term consequences of the case, see Paul W. Kahn, The 
Reign of Law: Marbury V. Madison and the Construction of America (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2002); Mark V. Tushnet (ed.), Arguing Marbury V. Madison (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2005); Goldstone, The Activist, 2008; and Cliff Stone and David 
McKean, The Great Decision: Jefferson, Adams, Marshall, and the Battle for the Supreme Court 
(New York: Public Affairs, 2009). Despite the importance often ascribed to Marbury, several 
scholars have downplayed both the significance of Marshall’s opinion and the case’s overall 
relevance to the practice of judicial review in America. See, e.g., Edward S. Corwin, “Marbury v. 
Madison and the Doctrine of Judicial Review,” Michigan Law Review 12 (1914), 538-572; 
William Van Alstyne, “A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison,” Duke Law Journal 1 (1969), 1-
47: 36-37; David P. Currie, “The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the Federal 
Courts, 1801-1835,” University of Chicago Law Review 49.4 (1982), 646-724; James O’Fallon, 
“Marbury,” Stanford Law Review 44 (1992), 219-260; Jack N. Rakove, “The Origins of Judicial 
Review: A Plea for New Contexts,” Stanford Law Review 49.5 (1997), 1031-1064; Michael J. 
Klarman, “How Great Were the ‘Great’ Marshall Court Decisions?” Virginia Law Review 87.6 
(2001), 1111-1184: 1113-1125; Larry D. Kramer, “The Supreme Court 2000 Term—Foreword: 
We the Court,” Harvard Law Review 115 (2001), 4-169: 4-5; Sanford Levinson, “Why I Do Not 
Teach Marbury (Except to Eastern Europeans) and Why You Shouldn’t Either,” Wake Forest 
Law Review 38 (2002), 553-578; and Mark A. Graber, “Establishing Judicial Review: Marbury 
and the Judicial Act of 1789,” Tulsa Law Review 38.4 (2003), 609-650. For a good, recent 
overview of the debate surrounding Marbury’s proper place in American constitutional history, 
see Barry Friedman, “The Myths of Marbury,” in Tushnet, Arguing Marbury V. Madison, 65-87. 
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are rightfully acknowledged in any assessment of the opinion’s impact. But they do not 
tell the whole story. To enter into a discussion of Marbury is above all to enter into John 
Marshall’s discussion of the Constitution. For in drafting the Court’s majority opinion, 
Marshall did more than artfully avoid a direct political clash between the Federalist 
judiciary and its Jeffersonian critics. More important, he offered a detailed justification of 
the binding authority of the Constitution, a justification that yields a purchase for 
surveying and challenging assumptions implicit in contemporary arguments concerning 
constitutional legitimacy. 
 While Marbury’s relevance for understanding the legal development of the United 
States needs little defense, scholars continue to disagree concerning the motives guiding 
Marshall’s authorship of the Court’s opinion. The most widespread interpretation of 
Marbury casts him as a cunning political operator who wielded the Constitution as a 
weapon against opponents of the Federalist Party.16 Almost as popular is the argument 
that he seized the occasion to achieve non-partisan ends, specifically building the national 
influence of a weak Supreme Court that lacked the power to enforce its verdicts.17 More 
                                                 
 16See Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1908); Edward S. Corwin, John Marshall and the Constitution, 66; 
Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process; Alexander M. Bickel, The Least 
Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 
1962); Samuel J. Konefsky, John Marshall and Alexander Hamilton, 87; Robert Faulkner, The 
Jurisprudence of John Marshall, 200-212; and Francis N. Stites, John Marshall: Defender of the 
Constitution, 1981. Further underscoring Marshall’s alleged partisanship is his significant 
reliance on Alexander Hamilton’s reasoning in support of judicial review in Federalist #78 to 
justify the Court’s use of the practice in Marbury. See Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and 
John Jay, The Federalist, ed. J.R. Pole (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2005), 411-418. 
 
 17See Akhil Reed Amar, “Marbury, Section 13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court,” University of Chicago Law Review 56 (1989), 443-499; Paul W. Kahn, The 
Reign of Law, 118-119; and Robert G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2010), 25-27. 
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recently, a small but emphatic camp of scholars has challenged the consensus opinion 
that Marbury was a product of either partisanship or institution building, arguing instead 
that the decision set forth a fair and neutral interpretation of the Constitution.18 It is 
important to note, however, that none of these accounts conflicts with Marshall’s role as a 
figure who enhanced the Constitution’s standing in the nation.19 Thus his most 
hagiographic admirer, Albert Beveridge, could praise Marbury for its “perfectly 
calculated audacity” in engineering “a coup” on behalf of written constitutions “as bold 
in design and as daring in execution as that by which the Constitution had been 
framed.”20  
 Absent among these evaluations, however, is a serious discussion of Marshall’s 
role in establishing the Constitution’s legitimacy. It is true that following its ratification, 
there was surprisingly little argument as to whether the American Constitution was the 
nation’s supreme law. Instead, its Antifederalist opponents swiftly turned from criticizing 
the Constitution’s new national plan of government to effecting political change through 
                                                 
 18See William E. Nelson, “The Eighteenth-Century Background of John Marshall’s 
Constitutional Jurisprudence,” Michigan Law Review 76 (1978), 893-960; Christopher Wolfe, 
“John Marshall and Constitutional Law,” Polity 15 (1989), 5-25; Robert Lowery Clinton, 
Marbury V. Madison and Judicial Review, 79; and R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall and the 
Heroic Age, 162-163. 
  
 19On the Supreme Court’s insignificance prior to Marshall’s judgeship, see James F. 
Simon, What Kind of Nation: Thomas Jefferson, John Marshall, and the Epic Struggle to Create 
a United States (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 138-139. 
 
 20Albert Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 
1919) 3: 132, 142. For Beveridge, Marshall’s deftness was to be celebrated, not criticized: “The 
assertion [of constitutional supremacy] … was the deed of a great man. One of narrower vision 
and smaller courage never would have done what Marshall did. In his management and decision 
of this case, at the time and under the circumstances, Marshall’s acts and words were those of a 
statesman of the first rank” (142-3). 
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its amendment process.21 Most Americans acknowledged the Constitution as the binding 
law of the land, as both Federalists and Jeffersonians “accepted the Constitution as their 
standard,” writes John Murrin, even as the two sides differed sharply on the question of 
how best to implement the government it created.22 Moreover, as Keith Whittington has 
argued, despite Federalist fears attending the so-called “Revolution of 1800” and the rise 
of Thomas Jefferson to the Presidency, Jeffersonians largely viewed their mission as 
rescuing the framers’ work from the “constitutional errors” of their Federalist enemies.23 
Even so, loyalty to the Constitution meant different things to different people, so that 
long after its ratification, there was no single explanation for the Constitution’s binding 
authority. To no small degree, Marshall’s achievement in Marbury lay in his ability to 
sort through and lend a measure of coherence to these diverse explanations, thereby 
providing an opinion that organized and clarified the grounds for citizen’s obedience to 
the Constitution.24  
                                                 
 21On this point, see Lance Banning, “Republican Ideology and the Triumph of the 
Constitution,” The William and Mary Quarterly 31 (1974), 167-188. 
 
 22John Murrin, “A Roof Without Walls: The Dilemma of American National Identity,” in 
Beyond Confederation: Origins of The Constitution and American National Identity, eds. Richard 
Beeman, Stephen Botein, and Edward C. Carter,  Jr. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1987), 333-348: 346. 
 
 23Keith Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2007), 54. 
 
 24Of course, Marshall’s efforts to build constitutional loyalty were hardly confined to just 
Marbury. A more comprehensive appraisal of this commitment must show how his theory 
unfolded and matured throughout his Supreme Court opinions (as well as his other writings), 
including pivotal decisions such as Fletcher v. Peck (1810), Dartmouth College v. Woodward 
(1810), McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), and Gibbons v. Ogden (1824). However, close attention 
to Marbury reveals one of his earliest as well as most forceful defenses of the Constitution’s 
legitimacy. 
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Arguments concerning constitutional legitimacy remain alive and well. After all, 
governments must justify their existence to those who are required to live under them in 
any age.25 Applied to political institutions such as Congress or the Supreme Court, 
questions concerning legitimacy typically address the right by which such institutions 
wield political authority over citizens.26 In relation to constitutions, however, 
justifications of legitimacy must address an even more difficult question, which is why 
the words of the constitution should be followed as opposed to an alternative law, 
authority, or tradition.27 Thus an ongoing conversation among scholars of European 
integration concerns the question of whether the legitimacy of traditional national 
constitutions can be made compatible with the constitutional basis of the European 
Union. In answer to this question, political thinkers led by Jürgen Habermas have 
struggled to find new justifications of constitutional authority that look to a constitution’s 
function in knitting together people who lack a common heritage but share the same 
                                                 
 25See Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (New York: Oxford University Press 1991), 
30. For more extensive treatments of this concept, see Randy E. Barnett, “Constitutional 
Legitimacy,” Columbia Law Review 103 (2003), 111-148; Frank I. Michelman, “Is the 
Constitution a Contract for Legitimacy?” Review of Constitutional Studies 8 (2003), 101-128; 
Richard H. Fallon, “Legitimacy and the Constitution,” Harvard Law Review 118 (2005), 1787-
1853; and Carl Schmitt, Constitutional Theory (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 136-
139. 
 
 26Richard Fallon, Implementing the Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2001), 118. As Rodney Barker remarks, “legitimacy is precisely the belief in the 
rightfulness of a state, in its authority to issue commands, so that those commands are obeyed not 
simply out of fear or self-interest, but because they are believed in some sense to have moral 
authority.” See his Legitimating Identities: The Self-Presentations of Rulers and Subjects 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 87. 
 
 27As Randy Barnett puts it, “the problem of constitutional legitimacy is to establish why 
anyone should obey the command of a constitutionally-valid law.” See Barnett, “Constitutional 
Legitimacy,” 111. 
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constitutionally governed territory.28 Indeed, even in the United States, where 
constitutional legitimacy would seem to be more self-evident, the concept is much 
debated and surprisingly little understood. As a result, writes Richard Fallon, “confusion 
often results—not only among readers and listeners, but also … in the minds of those 
who write and speak about constitutional legitimacy.”29 
 A survey of contemporary discussions of the Constitution’s authority reveals that 
there is seldom any agreement concerning the one element of the Constitution that 
ensures its legitimacy. Some thinkers argue that the Constitution is fundamental law, an 
eighteenth century text that protects individual liberties by constraining the ability of 
future elected officials and popular majorities to invade individual rights.30 For these 
thinkers, the Constitution is delicate parchment: secure from the sullying touch of 
ordinary citizens, it issues its commands from under protective glass. Others contend that 
the Constitution is a continuing creation that binds citizens, at least for some duration of 
time, to the conditional consent given by the American people to its rule.31 Their 
                                                 
 28See Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, 499 and Müller, “A European 
Constitutional Patriotism? The Case Restated,” 542-557. 
 
 29Fallon, “Legitimacy and the Constitution,” 1790. 
 
 30See Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens; Studies in Rationality and Irrationality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property 
and the Power of Eminent Domain (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985); Cass R. 
Sunstein, “Constitutions and Democracies: An Epilogue,” in Constitutionalism and Democracy, 
eds. Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 327-356; 
Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraints (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Adam 
Przeworski, Sustainable Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 50; Jon 
Elster, Ulysses Unbound (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and Richard A. 
Epstein, The Classical Liberal Constitution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014). 
 
 31See Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in  
England and America (New York: Norton, 1988), 13-14; Bruce Ackerman, We the People:  
Foundations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); Bruce Ackerman, We the  
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arguments suggest that the Constitution should appear frayed and worn: sometimes 
marked through, occasionally re-written entirely. Finally, there are those who are 
persuaded that the Constitution binds citizens because of its instrumental role as a 
settlement device, providing a practical roadmap or set of “focal points” for organizing 
politics.32 Proponents of this view conceive of the Constitution as a valuable but well-
used atlas that continues to prove handy when one gets lost. Each of these justifications 
address important principles embodied in the American Constitution, and none of them 
discount rights, consent, or the Constitution’s instrumental value as sources of its 
legitimacy. Yet all too often these approaches look to a single paramount explanation that 
gives the Constitution its binding authority. Consequently, while today there is virtually 
no debate among constitutional theorists as to whether the words of the Constitution bind 
judges and ordinary citizens alike to its rule, the question of why it is legitimate remains a 
subject of debate.33 
                                                 
People: Transformations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); Jason Frank, 
Constituent Moments (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010); and Bruce Ackerman,  
We the People: The Civil Rights Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014). 
 
 32See Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, “On Extrajudicial Constitutional   
Interpretation,” Harvard Law Review 110.7 (1997), 1359-1387; Barry R. Weingast “The Political 
Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law,” American Political Science Review 91.2 
(1997), 245-263; John M. Carey, “Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions,” Comparative Political 
Studies 33 (2000), 735-761; Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, “Defending Judicial 
Supremacy: A Reply,” Constitutional Commentary 17.3 (2000), 455-482; and David Strauss, The 
Living Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
 
 33To be sure, several arguments concerning legitimacy do not fall neatly within the rights, 
consent, and settlement silos. The imposition of order on society, the ability of legal rules and 
institutions to achieve good government in light of social demographics, and the creation of an 
affective attachment to the nation have all been looked to as sources of constitutional legitimacy. 
Hence, while the theories discussed in this analysis may represent the most well-known 
justifications of constitutional authority, they are by no means exhaustive. For a recent overview 
of some of these alternative theories, see Mark A. Graber, A New Introduction to American 
Constitutionalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 40-64. 
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 The simplest way to provide a more unified approach to constitutional legitimacy 
would be to embrace each of these views, combining them together into a more 
comprehensive defense of the Constitution’s binding authority. Yet greater inclusion by 
itself cannot address a blind spot common to these theories, which is the notion that a 
reasonably just constitution exercises its own binding authority in the absence of better 
alternatives. What is therefore needed is a more developed theory of the Constitution’s 
basic moral legitimacy. To this end, a careful examination of Marshall’s words in 
Marbury v. Madison provides an opening for conceptualizing the Constitution’s 
legitimacy that both locates elements of the existing approaches and reaches beyond their 
limitations. 
Marbury v. Madison Reconsidered 
 The facts of the case date back to the final days of the administration of President 
John Adams in March 1801. Worried that the incoming Jefferson administration and new 
Democratic-Republican Congress would fill the federal judiciary with party loyalists, 
Adams nominated a slate of fifty-two candidates to fill various federal judicial offices 
only days before leaving office.34 Although the nominees were confirmed by the Senate 
and their written commissions signed by Adams, several commissions belonging to these 
“midnight judges” remained undelivered (ironically by then-Secretary of State John 
Marshall) when Thomas Jefferson was inaugurated as the nation’s third President. Upon 
learning of the failed deliveries, Jefferson ordered his Attorney General, Levi Lincoln, to 
                                                 
 34For more detailed discussions of the events leading up to the case as well as the 
arguments presented to the Court, consider Van Alstyne, “A Critical Guide to Marbury v. 
Madison,” 160-165; Smith, John Marshall: Definer of a Nation, 309-326; and Simon, What Kind 
of Nation, 173-190. 
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disregard Adams’s appointments, basing his decision on the belief that non-lifetime 
appointments were revocable. After Jefferson sent his own candidates to the Senate for 
confirmation, a number of the previous appointees, including one William Marbury, 
petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus enjoining the new Secretary of 
State James Madison to recognize their commissions, along with those of the other 
Adams appointees.35 Opening arguments in Marbury v. Madison began on February 10, 
1803, with Attorney General Lincoln representing the government and former Attorney 
General Charles Lee representing Marbury. 
 Notwithstanding able arguments presented by both attorneys, the verdict was 
unanimous. On February 24, Marshall delivered the Court’s opinion, which was 
structured as a series of answers to three questions. First, did Marbury possess a title to 
his commission? Second, was the administration obliged to recognize his appointment? 
And finally, did the Supreme Court have the power to issue a writ of mandamus 
compelling the Secretary of State to accept the commissions? Marshall concurred with 
the plaintiff’s argument that Marbury did possess a proprietary right to his appointment, 
and furthermore that the laws of the nation afforded him a legal remedy for the 
deprivation of his right. But in a surprising twist, the Chief Justice denied that the 
Supreme Court was the proper body for issuing the writ of mandamus, holding that 
section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which in broadening the Supreme Court’s 
jurisdictional authority had permitted the Court to hear Marbury, violated the 
constitutional provisions governing the Court’s original jurisdiction set forth in Article VI 
of the Constitution. Thus the Court asserted the superiority of constitutional over ordinary 
                                                 
 35Marbury was Adams’ nominee for Justice of the Peace for the District of Columbia. 
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law, striking down as invalid section 13, and with it, the legal standing of Marbury and 
the rest of Adams’s appointees. 
 Marshall did not reserve his discussion of the Constitution to the rousing 
conclusion of Marbury. On the contrary, the Constitution is referenced eloquently and 
often provocatively throughout his opinion, and its authority is justified from multiple 
vantage points. Obviously, differences exist between Marshall’s understanding of the 
Constitution’s role and contemporary ones. But in allowing him to put forth his 
distinctive understanding of the Constitution’s authority, Marbury provided Marshall 
with the opportunity to apply what have become some of our most important theories of 
constitutional legitimacy. He began with a discussion of rights.  
Marbury and the Protection of Rights  
 Among constitutional theorists, many argue that a written constitution’s principal 
purpose is to protect citizen’s rights.36 For these thinkers, popular majorities, and 
particularly their elected representatives, will override individual liberties if not legally 
restrained from doing so. Ronald Dworkin has made this case well over the course of 
several decades. “The constitutional theory on which our government rests is not a simple 
majoritarian theory,” Dworkin writes. “The Constitution, and particularly the Bill of 
Rights, is designed to protect individual citizens and groups against certain decisions that 
a majority of citizens might want to make, even when that majority acts in what it takes 
                                                 
 36See, e.g., Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy (Boston, MA: 
Little Brown and Company, 1941); Owen Fiss, “Groups and the Equal Protection Clause,” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs 5.2 (1976), 107-177; Harry N. Hirsch, A Theory of Liberty: The 
Constitution and Minorities (New York: Routledge, 1992); and Friedrich A. Hayek, The 
Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011). 
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to be the general or common interest.”37 Working from these assumptions, Dworkin has 
argued that a legitimate constitution must contain provisions that “disable” majority rule 
by codifying political and individual liberties alongside provisions that “enable” 
collective political decisions.38 He goes on to assert that such a theory provides a 
constitutional conception of democracy that is based on the principle of equality rather 
than on its traditional association with majority rule. Accordingly, each member of the 
community is treated “with equal concern and respect,” and “citizens’ most basic 
freedoms” are protected from infringement by the democratic process.39 The argument is 
by no means a recent one: the purpose of the Constitution as a bridle upon the dangers of 
popular rule was a prominent opinion voiced by political leaders throughout the Founding 
era. One need only turn to the warnings of James Madison himself in his famous 
Federalist #10 for evidence of this widespread concern with securing the “public good 
and private rights” from the special “danger” posed by majority faction.40 
 Much of the first half of Marshall’s opinion is centered on rights, and specifically 
on Marbury’s right to assert legal title to his appointment as Justice of the Peace of the 
District of Columbia. Here it is important to note that it is unclear whether this matter 
                                                 
 37See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 
2013), 165. See also Cass Sunstein’s argument that “Constitutions operate as constraints on the 
governing ability of majorities; they are naturally taken as antidemocratic,” and that these 
protections are encoded in the constitutional text both explicitly (through amendments) and 
implicitly (through the separation of powers). In his “Constitutionalism and Democracy: An 
Epilogue,” 327-328.  
 
 38Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the Constitution (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 21.  
 
 39Ibid., 73. 
 
 40Hamilton et al., The Federalist, 48. 
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needed to be addressed at all by the Court, let alone as its starting point. Indeed, 
Marshall’s decision to pursue this question has often cast suspicion on his motives in the 
case.41 As John Brigham’s discussion of Marbury points out, “It seems obvious now that 
this talk of rights is an appropriate form of inquiry, but 200 years ago the legal 
foundations of the national Union were anything but certain.”42 Perhaps it was partly out 
of concern for crafting such foundations that Marshall agreed with the prosecution’s 
claim that Marbury did hold a title to his commission. As he put it, the determinative 
moment that guaranteed Marbury’s title was not the formal delivery of the sealed 
commission or any other “solemnities” involved in the confirmation process, as the 
attorneys for the Jefferson administration had argued. Ceremonies of delivery were 
“directed by convenience, not by law.” The key turning point was the President’s 
signature, for once affixed, deliberation had ceased, a decision had been rendered, and 
Adams’ signature had given immediate “force and effect to the commission.” Thus 
inscribed, Adams’s constitutional power of appointment was discharged completely: “his 
judgment” had been made, and “the right of the office” was conveyed in whole from the 
President to his appointee. “The right to the office is then in the person appointed,” 
                                                 
 41As Corwin points out, “Marshall, reversing the usual order of procedure, left the 
question of jurisdiction till the very last, and so created for himself an opportunity to lecture the 
President on his duty to obey the law and to deliver the commission.” In John Marshall and the 
Constitution, 65. For a similar criticism, see Susan Low Bloch and Maeva Marcus, “John 
Marshall’s Selective Use of History in Marbury v. Madison,” Wisconsin Law Review 301 (1986), 
301-337. 
 
 42John Brigham, “Political Epistemology: John Marshall’s Propositions for Modern 
Constitutional Law,” in Shevory, John Marshall’s Achievement, 159-172: 162. 
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concluded Marshall, “and he was the absolute, unconditional, power of accepting or 
rejecting it.”43  
 Marshall drew on the familiar language of investiture to describe this 
transference. According to this doctrine, which had its origins in natural law philosophy, 
an individual was endowed with certain basic rights that were not subject to government 
control, including the possession and acquisition of private property.44 On Marshall’s 
understanding, Marbury was “invested” with a title to his office no different in its legal 
validity than “a patent for land.” As was the case with any legal right, Marbury’s was 
“protected by the laws of his country.”45 Marshall made the point in some of his most 
forceful and enduring language from the bench: 
 The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of 
 laws, & not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws 
 furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.46  
 
Admittedly, Marbury’s was a statutory, not a constitutional right. But for Marshall, 
Marbury’s vested right was part of a bigger picture. Here he used the particular case of 
Marbury’s commission to make the broader point that the protection of rights was a 
fundamental purpose of government. Marbury’s right to his office “was not revocable,” 
                                                 
 43John Marshall, “Marbury v. Madison,” in The Papers of John Marshall, ed. Charles 
Hobson (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1990) 6, 160-187: 168, 169, 171. 
 
 44See James W. Ely, “The Marshall Court and Property Rights: A Reappraisal,” John 
Marshall Law Review 33 (2000), 1023-1061: 1048. Robert Faulkner, who is careful not to 
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he averred, and was secured “by the laws of his country.” Indeed, he declared, “[t]he very 
essence of civil liberty” consisted of a citizen’s legal protection from injury, and one of 
government’s “first duties” was to afford such protection.47 In making this argument, 
Marshall moved seamlessly from discussing the Constitution’s protection of vested 
statutory rights to an amplification of the document’s defense of the “absolute rights of 
individuals.”48 The tensions existing between these categories mattered less to him than 
the fact that both forms of rights were secured by the rule of law. 
 Having established Marbury’s title to the commission, Marshall next turned to the 
question of whether the protection of this right was superseded by Jefferson’s 
constitutional powers as Chief Executive. By taking up the topic, the Chief Justice 
implicitly repudiated the administration’s position that the appointment process, along 
with executive branch decisions generally, was free from inspection by the judiciary. But 
he did not go so far as to claim that every decision made by the President and his officers 
was subject to review by the nation’s courts, acknowledging a realm of discretion within 
which the President exercised independent authority (“accountable only to his country in 
his political character, and to his own conscience”). The exercise of these legitimate 
powers affected “the nation, not individual rights, and, being entrusted to the Executive, 
the decision of the Executive is conclusive.” These distinctly “political powers” adhering 
to the office of the Presidency entailed some measure of independent authority and 
freedom, including the latitude to “appoint certain officers, who act by his authority and 
in conformity with his orders.” The recent establishment by Congress of the Department 
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of Foreign Affairs was an example ready at hand for Marshall. The officers of that 
department, Marshall explained, were “to conform precisely to the will of the President. 
He is the mere organ by whom that will is communicated.” Indeed, as Marshall 
concluded with a tone of finality, “the acts of such an officer, as an officer, can never be 
examinable by the Courts.”49  
 Up until this point in the opinion, the Jefferson administration appeared to be in 
the clear. Yet the Chief Justice next argued that the administration did not possess the 
authority to annul Adams’ appointments. Although the President and his cabinet 
possessed considerable authority for exercising their own discretion with respect to the 
affairs of the nation, this realm of discretion did not extend to the liberties of citizens. On 
occasions “where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend on the 
performance of that duty,” members of the executive branch complied with the 
Constitution rather than exercised their own discretion.50 In his capacity as a public 
minister of the law, Secretary of State Madison did not have the authority to refuse 
Adams’s appointees and sport away vested rights—a minor distinction in the opinion that 
would prove to have far-reaching consequences for legal limitations on presidential 
power in landmark cases such as United States v. Aaron Burr (1807) and United States v. 
Nixon (1974).51  
                                                 
 49Ibid., 174. 
 
 50Ibid. 
 
 51Considered another way, the political questions doctrine might be viewed as an 
emancipation rather than restriction of executive powers. It cannot be denied that Marshall 
limited the scope of judicial authority along with that of the President’s: “The province of the 
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executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion.” See Ibid., 177. 
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 Recognizing Marbury’s commission thus signaled a larger acknowledgment that 
the government of the United States rested its authority on its ability to safeguard rights 
from political interference, which in Marbury included the right of citizens to seek and 
obtain legal redress when those rights were violated. Accordingly, Marshall defended the 
constraining force of the rule of law against decisions of political leaders that conflicted 
with constitutional protections, even when leaders such as Jefferson drew support from 
popular majorities. But what authority codified the protection of these rights in the form 
of a constitution? Having established Marbury’s legal rights, Marshall turns to the 
important role of the American people in the creation of the Constitution. His retelling of 
their performance of this task indicates how popular sovereignty complements traditional 
approaches to rights-based constitutionalism. 
Marbury and the Role of Popular Sovereignty  
 A number of constitutional theorists look less to rights and more to the American 
people in locating legitimacy. The standard Lockean authorization of political consent—
that is, as an express act of agreement to political authority by the governed—was one of 
the most familiar definitions of the concept in Marshall’s time, and the significance of 
“majoritarian and populist mechanisms” as the keystone of the Constitution’s legitimacy 
has continued to the present day.52 Bruce Ackerman, for instance, describes the Founding 
as a moment of revolutionary politics that entailed the development of “a distinctive form 
of constitutional practice” that “established paradigms for legitimate practices of higher 
                                                 
 
 52Compare John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 
1980), 52-65 and Akhil Reed Amar, “Popular sovereignty and constitutional amendment," in 
Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment, ed. Sanford 
Levinson (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1995), 89-116. 
 
 27 
 
lawmaking that subsequent generations have developed further.”53 Such moments of 
“higher lawmaking” by the American people are rare, and they are distinguished by 
certain conditions: they must attract public attention to a greater extent than the ordinary, 
everyday political process; they involve the voice of a mobilized opposition; and they 
entail a majority of the population’s support for legal initiatives based on their merits.54 
Ackerman argues that these self-conscious exercises of popular sovereignty—
specifically, at the time of the Founding, Reconstruction, the New Deal, and the Civil 
Rights movements of the 1950s and 1960s—differentiate representative democracy from 
constitutive moments representing the “considered judgments made by the People.”55 
Like Dworkin, Ackerman celebrates the abstract principles found in the Constitution. 
Unlike Dworkin, however, he views these principles as levers for collective political 
action rather than justifications for an expansive conception of rights. As he put it in a 
recent summary of his position, “the Constitution’s authority is generated by the 
mobilized and self-conscious commitments of We the People.”56 
 Once he had established the Constitution’s protection of rights, Marshall next 
turned to this issue of popular consent. The context of the discussion was whether the 
                                                 
 53See Ackerman, We the People: The Civil Rights Revolution, 3. 
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 55Ibid., 5. More recently, the argument on behalf of consent as the basis of constitutional 
legitimacy has been taken up by Jack Balkin, who holds that “[p]ast acts create a framework—the 
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Supreme Court could exercise the discretion conferred upon it by section 13 of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, a provision that expanded the original jurisdiction of the Court 
partly in an effort to relieve the case burden on state courts.57 For Marshall, the question 
of whether the Court could issue a writ of mandamus to Secretary Madison as permitted 
by Congress meant addressing the issue of “whether an act repugnant to the Constitution 
can become the law of the land,” an issue he saw as “deeply interesting to the United 
States.”58 To answer this question, Marshall without reservation invoked the will of the 
people and its authority in striking down section 13. As he saw it, the American people 
were the sole authority behind constitutional government, and their power narrowed the 
scope of future legislation. Here, as in his defense of Marbury’s commission, Marshall 
stood on noncontroversial ground, the will of the people being one of many popular 
justifications of constitutional authority.59 
 The reason why the Constitution was supreme to ordinary law, according to 
Marshall, was straightforward: the document’s ultimate authority stemmed from the 
American people, who had both established and consented to its legal authority. Although 
Marshall does mention the intentions of the framers in Marbury, he emphasizes to a 
greater degree the role of the people as authors of the Constitution. Indeed, turning his 
opinion into what R. Kent Newmyer has called “a lesson in republican civics,” he 
                                                 
 57Marbury, 181.  
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 59On the importance of consent for state constitutions during the Founding period, see 
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proceeded to claim that “the whole American fabric” was based upon the principle that 
“the people have an original right to establish, for their future government, such 
principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness.”60 The exercise 
of this right was an unusual exertion of the will of the people, one that could not and 
should not be repeated often. As he put it, the “original and supreme will” of the people 
had organized the government, allocating political powers among “different 
departments.” In addition, the people did not grant authority to the three branches of 
government indiscriminately but had resolved to impose “limits not to be transcended by 
those departments.” These limits apply especially to Congress: “The powers of the 
legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or 
forgotten, the constitution is written.” Both of these decisions— to form a national 
government and to set limits on its legislative authority—were based not on impulse but 
on the people’s “contemplation” and decision to create a “fundamental and paramount 
law of the nation.”61 Only by understanding these popular origins of the Constitution 
could the reason for the binding character of its provisions be fully understood. 
 This interpretation of the Constitution’s origins raised alarms among the opinion’s 
Democratic-Republican readers, who had long feared that the Preamble’s claim to speak 
on behalf of “We the People” aimed to collapse the thirteen state governments into a 
single, corporate nation.62 Marshall’s portrayal of the Constitution as a product of 
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collective deliberation and determination rendered by all Americans—or “reflection and 
choice,” as Alexander Hamilton described in Federalist #1—stood in direct contrast to 
Anti-Federalist and Jeffersonian interpretations of the document as nothing more than a 
mere alliance among the sovereign states. But Marshall was hardly advocating mass 
democracy. While it was the people alone who were ultimately responsible for the 
momentous decision to create a Constitution, Marshall was careful not to exaggerate their 
future importance. Although the Constitution’s supremacy was based on the principle of 
popular sovereignty, he cautioned that the collective exercise of this authority was 
reserved for exceptional occasions. Going forward, the American people would hold the 
narrower responsibility of holding elected officials accountable for their political 
decisions at the ballot box. 
 Marshall’s constitutionalism emphasizes the importance of popular sovereignty, 
agreeing with Ackerman on both the singularity of its exercise as well as the deliberation 
such movements require in order to confer legitimacy.63 Moreover, as Marshall saw it, 
popular sovereignty was the ultimate source of the rights protections found in the 
Constitution. The authority of the people was “supreme,” he declared in no uncertain 
terms, and the principles they established were “designed to be permanent.”64  Rights and 
consent were therefore two complementary pillars upon which the Constitution’s 
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legitimacy stood. But do these two objects exhaust the justifications for constitutional 
obedience? What immediate, day-to-day guidance might the Constitution provide for 
national politics? While Marshall emphasized the Constitution’s protection for rights and 
its basis in consent, he also located the source of the document’s legitimacy in more 
practical terms. This understanding proved especially important in lending force to the 
closing argument of the Court’s opinion. 
Marbury and the Constitution as “Focal Point”  
 A third way that some constitutional theorists locate legitimacy is to portray the 
Constitution in more instrumental terms, by basing the text’s binding authority on its 
ability to organize, settle, and otherwise provide safe direction to the political affairs of a 
nation. Beyond the document’s status as a guardian of rights and object of consent, these 
thinkers rest its legitimacy on its ability to institute and maintain stability amid political 
disagreement.65 Put simply, as the nation’s supreme law, the Constitution furnishes “focal 
points” that act as a roadmap for the political system and legislative agenda. This 
function has been described best by legal theorist David Strauss, who works from the 
premise that individuals in any social setting inevitably “disagree about various 
questions, large and small, related to how the government should be organized and 
operated.”66 Political rules that may seem straightforward and innocuous to many 
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Americans, such as the appropriate duration of the President’s term of office or whether 
Congress should have one or two chambers, might otherwise hamstring the political 
process and even lead to “disastrous” consequences for the stability of the state were they 
left open-ended. The Constitution prevents this scenario insofar as its textual provisions 
provide a means to “settle” weighty political concerns. While the text may not offer an 
ideal solution to these fundamental political dilemmas, it does render a satisfactory one 
that people can live with. Hence, says Strauss, obedience to the Constitution as supreme 
law is grounded in “the practical judgment that following this text, despite its 
shortcomings, is on balance a good thing to do because it resolves issues that have to be 
resolved one way or the other.”67 This approach shows that the Constitution is valuable 
not because it pretends to embody either rights or the will of the people, but because it 
solves political disputes that would otherwise create serious social divisions through 
interminable litigation, frustrating the more immediately pressing policy needs of the 
nation. Put simply, constitutions are binding due to their practicality. Moreover, as 
Strauss argues, conceiving of the Constitution in this functional manner offers a clear and 
uncomplicated explanation for its status as supreme law, one that makes sense even to 
those with little attachment to the United States or even to the rule of law.68  
 Although the Constitution certainly settled a host of interstate difficulties 
attending the Articles of Confederation, this purpose had not achieved the same 
prominence as either rights or consent as an explanation for its authority at the time of 
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Marbury. Indeed, as John Phillip Reid has pointed out, the great influence of the social 
contract tradition with its vocabulary of rights and consent often rendered alternative 
viewpoints of constitutional authority to a peripheral status.69 Marshall’s discussion of the 
provisions of the Constitution that gave order, rules, and direction to the nation’s politics 
made clearer than ever before this instrumental function of the Constitution. Each part of 
the Constitution was intended to have a regulative effect on national politics, lest any of 
its clauses should be rendered as “mere surplusage” and “form without substance.”70 In 
arguing these points, Marshall moved beyond the familiar terms of the debate involving 
rights and consent, and drew attention to the organizational role the Constitution would 
play in American politics.  
 One national focal point that figures heavily in Marbury is the Supreme Court 
itself. At the time of Marbury, the Constitution lacked an authoritative and final 
expositor, and it was by no means clear that the Court could pass judgment upon the 
constitutionality of the actions of the political branches.71 Yet Marshall is emphatic that 
the safest way to organize judgments of constitutionality is to confine such 
determinations to the Supreme Court. Marshall expressed no doubts here. Turning to the 
language of Article Three, he notes that the Constitution “vests the whole judicial power 
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between Marshall’s and James Madison’s views on constitutional interpretation and authority, see 
Michael Zuckert, “Epistemology and Hermeneutics in the Constitutional Jurisprudence of John 
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of the United States” in a single Supreme Court and “such inferior courts” established 
from time to time by Congress.72 Its words, he wrote, “expressly extended” this power 
“to all cases arising under the laws of the United States.” It was thus the Supreme Court’s 
“province and duty … to say what the law is” when a law conflicted with the 
Constitution.73 It was up to the Court, in other words, to evaluate legislation, and even its 
own conduct, against the standards set by the Constitution. Moreover, he continued, the 
Court did not reach its decisions on the basis of extraneous legal traditions or particular 
ideologies. Instead, the object that governed judges’ conduct in their official character 
was the constitutional text itself, given that the framers had “contemplated that 
instrument as a rule for the government of courts, as well as the legislature.”74 Thus the 
only location for authoritative judgments of constitutionality in the case of justiciable 
controversy was the Supreme Court, and the Court’s decisions on constitutional questions 
were determined solely by the Constitution. The Constitution was a guide for the nation 
and the nation’s courts, a document that must be opened, read, “looked into,” and 
“inspected.”75 
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 In addition to providing guidance for its interpretation, the Constitution provided 
specific signposts to define and limit congressional power. For example, Article One 
prohibited state-issued taxes and duties. It also expressly forbade ex post facto laws and 
bills of attainder. Article Three provided clear instructions to the judiciary regarding 
treason convictions. Quoting this clause in full, Marshall notes that “no person shall be 
convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on 
confession in open court." Emphasizing that “many other selections” might be 
mentioned, he went on to affirm that such provisions illustrated that the Constitution was 
a guiding “rule” for both legislation and judicial decisions, and that such “constitutional 
principles” must never yield to an act of Congress. Reducing the Constitution to a status 
equal to that of “an ordinary act of the legislature,” he warned, would give “to the 
legislature a practical and real omnipotence” in the nation’s political affairs.76  
 Finally, Marshall draws attention to the oath of office as a constitutional focal 
point common to all branches of government insofar as it puts all members of the 
government under the obligation to support and defend the Constitution. Approaching the 
close of his decision, he portrays this oath not as an empty ceremony, but as a solemn 
vow to subordinate all decisions and “conduct in their official character” to the strictures 
of constitutional law. Why else, he asks, must a judge take this oath “to discharge his 
duties agreeably to the Constitution of the United States if that Constitution forms no rule 
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for his government?”77 If the oath did not carry with it the duty to regard the Constitution 
as such a rule, then both prescribing and taking the oath would be “equally a crime.” 
Although the oaths taken by Presidents, justices, and members of Congress upon 
assuming office were different in length and content, in Marshall’s eyes they were 
uniform insofar as they obligated all to uphold the Constitution. Thus, as he puts it in the 
dramatic conclusion to Marbury, the “particular phraseology of the Constitution of the 
United States” confirms the document’s superiority to legislative law, and thus that 
“courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.”78  
 In the short term, the Court’s decision in Marbury proved uncontroversial, as the 
opinion met with little public outcry.79 Whether this subdued response signaled tacit 
approval or stunned outrage, it proved temporary. Jeffersonians soon drew battle lines 
against the Marshall Court, perceiving it as the last Federalist stronghold in the national 
government. In 1804, a warning shot was fired in the Chief Justice’s direction when 
Jefferson’s followers in the House of Representatives impeached Justice Samuel Chase. 
Though Chase was not convicted, Thomas Jefferson’s personal animus toward the Court 
in general and Marshall in particular never ebbed, even after his Presidency ended. 
Writing in 1819 to Judge Spencer Roane of the Virginia Court of Appeals, the former 
President would repudiate the notion that an unelected Supreme Court possessed "the 
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right to prescribe rules” governing Congress and the President. Giving the judiciary such 
absolute authority over the Constitution’s interpretation would reduce the document to “a 
mere thing of wax,” he wrote, which justices “may twist and shape into any form they 
please.”80 In hindsight, Marbury represented the first episode in a long and often 
acrimonious clash between the Court and its Jeffersonian critics. 
 Yet Marbury’s failure to quell partisan rancor should not diminish Marshall’s 
attempts at conciliation. As Gordon Wood points out, Marbury was the only occasion 
during Marshall’s long tenure as Chief Justice that the Court declared an act of Congress 
unconstitutional, and Marshall’s statement of the Court’s role in the American 
constitutional system attempted to strike a note of restraint.81 In justifying the binding 
authority the Constitution exercised on citizens, Marshall drew on familiar themes, not 
innovative ones. The Constitution protected the rights of citizens. It was authorized if not 
written by the original and supreme will of the people. While securing rights and 
embodying consent, it also served as a practical rulebook, identifying the Supreme Court 
as the site of constitutional interpretation while instituting boundaries on the reach of the 
national government. Among other matters, these boundaries included the limitations the 
Constitution placed upon the political powers of the President and the ability of Congress 
to extend the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction beyond constitutional limits. In Marbury, each 
of the dominant explanations for the Constitution’s legitimacy—rights, consent, and focal 
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points—are components of a broader and more unified narrative of its authoritative role 
in the United States.  
 But if each of these approaches to legitimacy furnishes only a partial 
understanding of the Constitution’s role in the United States, does merely lumping them 
together create a greater attachment to that document? Does creating such a partnership 
of principles add to or strengthen the Constitution’s legitimacy, or does it merely 
reinforce existing reasons for obedience? In response to these questions, it is worth 
paying attention to still other ways in which Marshall describes the Constitution in 
Marbury, and how in doing so he points to a theory of the Constitution’s moral 
legitimacy that refers to but also transcends the facets of his constitutionalism that have 
been examined so far.  
Marshall’s Theory of Constitutional Legitimacy 
 For many contemporary political and legal theorists, constitutions derive their 
legitimacy from more than their protection of liberties, their representation of consent, or 
their instrumental role in providing institutional and legal focal points for settling 
conflicts. These theories require more, linking a constitution’s legitimacy to its ability to 
provide a just legal regime based on its moral justifiability or its worthiness of respect. In 
the words of Habermas, “legitimacy means that there are good arguments for a political 
order’s claim to be recognized as right and just.”82 Disagreement abounds, however, 
concerning what threshold regimes must meet in order to be considered morally 
legitimate. Ideal theories of moral legitimacy stipulate that while no constitution is fully 
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legitimate, one can nonetheless be binding to the extent that it approximates an ideal 
moral standard such as justice or equality.83 For instance, Sotirios Barber and James 
Fleming have defended a moral or “philosophic” approach to constitutional interpretation, 
emphasizing the “abstract moral and political principles” embodied in the Constitution 
that demand from justices “normative judgments about how [such principles] are best 
understood, not merely historical research to discover relatively specific original 
meanings.”84 Such arguments see legitimacy in aspirational terms only, insofar as they 
furnish a model or set of values that a constitution may approximate but never fully 
realize.85 Alternatively, minimal theories of moral legitimacy insist that it is not necessary 
for a constitution to be morally legitimate in absolute terms in order to bind citizens to its 
rule, especially if a better, alternative constitution cannot be realized swiftly and 
peacefully.86 Indeed, as Richard Fallon claims, a “sufficiently just” constitution is better 
than no constitution, and so a constitution’s fundamental legitimacy may arise simply 
“from the facts that it exists, that it is accepted as law, that it is reasonably (rather than 
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completely) just, and that agreement to a better constitution would be difficult if not 
impossible to achieve.”87 Joseph Raz takes the argument a step further, reasoning that “as 
long as they remain within the boundaries set by moral principles, constitutions are self-
validating in that their validity derives from nothing more than the fact that they are 
there.”88 But whether these approaches emphasize an ideal or minimal moral legitimacy, 
on this much they agree: a constitution derives its legitimacy not only from rights, 
consent, or its settling function alone, but from its ability to situate these principles within 
the parameters of its moral justifiability.  
 In Marbury, Marshall resists making a stark choice between ideal and minimalist 
theories. On the contrary, he draws on both to advance a concept of moral legitimacy that 
challenges and reaches beyond the conceptual divide that separates them. On the one 
hand, his rhetoric in referring to constitutional principles is far too muscular for the 
comparatively uninspiring minimalist theories. On the other hand, he never describes the 
Constitution as ideal, nor did he hesitate to point out that constitutional government is 
better than no government at all.89 Marshall’s moral legitimacy falls below standards that 
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could never be realistically met but above those that any legal regime might possess. 
Thus in contrast to approaches that set the bar of moral legitimacy either too high or too 
low, Marbury stakes out a middle ground. 
 Even if the Constitution was not perfect, however, it was nonetheless worthy of 
reverence and veneration. Indeed, for Marshall, the Constitution demanded a form of 
devotion that verged on the reverential. As Chief Justice, he often spoke of the document 
in religious terms, invoking it as the nation’s “sacred” law.90 Nor did he shy away from 
using such language in Marbury. He minced no words when declaring that the oath taken 
by political officers to support the Constitution is an ethical as well as a legal bond: “How 
immoral,” he exclaims, “to impose [an oath] on them, if they were to be used as the 
instruments, and the knowing instruments, for violating what they swear to support!”91 
Elsewhere in the opinion he again applies similar rhetoric when contending that the 
Constitution is worthy of the same veneration Americans attached to their state 
constitutions, which had long “been viewed with so much reverence.”92 Marshall was 
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ever mindful of this moral dimension of the rule of law, one that could not be adequately 
captured in legal terms alone.  
 Yet such rhetoric, no matter how moving, has its limits. After all, calling for 
reverence cannot by itself establish that the Constitution promotes a just legal order. But 
Marshall’s theory of constitutional legitimacy is more than a stock of literary flourishes. 
Similar to ideal theories of moral legitimacy that emphasize principles such as justice, 
consent, and equality, Marshall’s rhetoric is anchored to the Constitution’s embodiment 
of fundamental principles that distinguished it from other legal documents. Referring to 
the constitutive power of the people, Marshall describes their accomplishment not only as 
an act of the people’s consent, but also as the pronouncement of “such principles as, in 
their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness.”93 Having been declared, these 
principles are “deemed fundamental” and become “permanent,” due in large part to the 
time and effort involved in their pronouncement.94 Inscribed in the Constitution, they are 
“the basis on which the whole American fabric has been erected.” Although Marshall 
does not specify these principles in detail, they can be easily inferred from his opinion: 
the formation of a national government, the defined and limited powers of the legislative 
branch, the Constitution’s protection of civil liberties, and its supremacy to legislative 
acts, as well as specific, legal directives based on common law and earlier legal 
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traditions.95 Together, these “essential” principles and rules supply the foundation for the 
rule of law, while also entailing a duty on the part of political officials to follow them.96 
Hence it was “necessity” and “the essence of judicial duty,” Marshall wrote, that 
obligated the Court to render a determination of legality when ordinary legislation 
conflicted with the constitutional text.97 While consent did play a legitimizing force for 
Marshall, it was the institution of those principles conducive to good government and the 
people’s happiness that helped make written constitutions “the greatest improvement on 
political institutions.”98 In short, it was not the act of consent alone that was important for 
the Constitution’s legitimacy, but the principles and objects that the people consented to 
and helped create. 
  Admittedly, Marshall also engaged minimalist understandings of moral 
legitimacy in arguing that the nation did not have a ready legal alternative to the 
Constitution. Here he provides a hint of what might follow from rejecting its legitimacy, 
producing for his readers a pair of stark political alternatives from which they must 
choose.99 The options typically appear overdrawn, perhaps intentionally, and they are 
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posed to a variety of people, including judges, legislators, and the general public. Judges 
are obliged to follow and defend the Constitution as “paramount law,” or they are 
“reduced to the necessity of” ignoring its words entirely, so that they “close their eyes on 
the Constitution, and see only the law.”100 When political officers swear to uphold and 
defend the Constitution, the oath of office either forms “a rule for the government of 
courts, as well as of the Legislatures,” or else its administration is a crime “worse than 
solemn mockery.”101 Either an act of Congress contrary to the Constitution must be 
struck down, or the “legislature may alter the Constitution by an ordinary act,” making 
written Constitutions “absurd attempts on the part of the people to limit a power in its 
own nature illimitable.” Finally, Marbury declares in bold and sweeping terms that there 
is “no middle ground” on the question of whether the Constitution is “a superior, 
paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means,” or “on a level with ordinary 
legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please.”102 For 
Marshall, one either accepts the Constitution as providing an effective legal order for 
holding the nation together, or one is confronted with an unlimited and potentially 
tyrannical legislature. 
 Yet presenting the Constitution’s moral legitimacy as a weave of principles and 
pragmatism was not enough for Marshall. Throughout the course of Marbury, he 
endeavors to amplify the Constitution’s legitimacy by emphasizing its essential and 
foundational character. Repeatedly he depicts the Constitution as exercising its own 
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power, enjoining the performance of actions and duties on the part of political officials, 
investing power in the judiciary, and prescribing rules governing admissible evidence.103 
At times he stands aside, allowing the Constitution to speak for itself, as when he 
carefully notes that it is the Constitution and not the Supreme Court that “has declared” 
where “their jurisdiction shall be original” and “where it shall be appellate.” Every word 
of the document is binding, Marshall stresses, for “it cannot be presumed that any clause 
in the Constitution is intended to be without effect.” The Constitution thus exerted a 
forcefulness that sets it apart from the Articles of Confederation. Moreover, he makes it 
clear that denying its legitimacy would lead to more than legal confusion or policy 
gridlock. Of worse consequence, it would render the basis of the Constitution “entirely 
void,” “subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions,” and undermine all the 
“principles and theory of our government.”104 Marshall’s theory of the Constitution’s 
moral legitimacy is one with teeth: in Marbury, the American Constitution—the entire 
American Constitution—is given its own voice as the nation’s supreme law.  
 Marbury v. Madison, like most of Marshall’s Supreme Court opinions, is a 
portrait of concise and methodical writing. It therefore appears odd, in light of his 
characteristic economy of words, that the language he uses to describe the Constitution 
requires more elaboration than he provides. How may we finally characterize Marshall’s 
theory of constitutional legitimacy? Marbury indicates that the Constitution encompassed 
more than a bundle of notions about rights, consent, and settlement functions. 
Constitutional loyalty ran deeper than that for Marshall. He viewed the document as 
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legitimate because as the nation’s supreme law it embodied principles citizens might not 
simply defer to but also revere as just foundations for good and stable government. 
Moreover, the federal Constitution was the only one the nation had. In the absence of 
realistic alternatives, its importance for supplying a coherent system of law applicable to 
all citizens should not be taken lightly, particularly given the myriad deficiencies 
attending the Articles of Confederation. Hence the Constitution deserved the veneration 
of all citizens as good law, but for those who were not persuaded by its merits, its moral 
legitimacy also stemmed from the fact that the nation could simply not do without one.  
Conclusion  
 Marbury stands as both an invitation and a provocation to contemporary debates 
concerning constitutional legitimacy. Marshall’s constitutionalism runs counter to 
approaches such as those of Dworkin, Ackerman, and Strauss, which tend to concentrate 
on distinctive purposes or functions as conferring legitimacy. Among these purposes are 
its protection of individual liberties, enshrinement of popular consent, and establishment 
of a blueprint for organizing politics. Since Marshall does not base his theory of 
legitimacy on any single justification, his opinion fosters a common ground for 
contemporary conversation concerning the basis of constitutional legitimacy. Yet 
however crucial these functions of the Constitution are to its legitimacy, they do not fully 
capture Marshall’s comprehensive understanding of its authority. Marshall envelops these 
attributes in his constitutionalism, but also invites a distinct appreciation of the 
Constitution as embodying a fundamental moral legitimacy that elevates the standing of 
the document in the hearts and minds of citizens. Neither utopian dreamer nor hardboiled 
minimalist, he conceived of the Constitution as simultaneously principled and practical, 
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embracing both the philosophical ends and the practical means required to establish a just 
and workable regime. Thus Marbury offers a concept of constitutional legitimacy that 
subsumes but reaches beyond contemporary conceptualizations, insisting that readers 
question the sufficiency of explanations that fail to capture the complex character of the 
rule of law.  
 In setting forth Marshall’s theory of constitutional legitimacy, Marbury also 
illustrates how constitutional loyalty is not simply a given, but must be constructed. 
While it is true that the Constitution was regarded as national law at the time the case was 
decided, viewpoints differed considerably regarding the particular element that granted 
the document its legitimacy. The opinion in Marbury is an example of how the 
Constitution’s legitimacy was and indeed remains a constructed conviction rather than an 
automatic one, the achievement of political craftsmanship as much as a product of the 
power of its words alone. Nor was Marshall unaware of the importance of his words 
within the larger political context of his time. As Christopher Eisgruber has argued, in 
light of the general public’s largely ambiguous attitude toward the national government 
during his tenure, the Chief Justice’s rhetoric was directed toward convincing Americans 
“that national institutions, including the federal judiciary, would govern well.”105 Given 
the role that his statesmanship and persuasion played in instilling in citizens a belief in 
the Constitution’s moral legitimacy, we might rethink the explanatory power of 
interpretations of Marshall that cast him as either a zealous defender of Federalist policies 
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or a figure who endeavored to transcend political matters entirely. Marshall was a 
considerably more complex political thinker than these cramped interpretations suggest. 
 Revisiting Marbury requires readers to reconsider the opinion, challenging the 
conventional wisdom that it is primarily concerned with judicial review. It also requires 
us to reconsider the conventional wisdom on John Marshall, who deserves to be seen as a 
formidable political thinker concerned with the concept of constitutional legitimacy. That 
said, Marbury and Marshall do not provide the final word on the topic. It is abundantly 
clear that Americans will continue to define and debate their constitutional fidelity 
according to many different standards. For Marshall, the tensions between these 
understandings should not necessarily be a source of worry. Rather, his arguments in 
Marbury show that the justifications we give for the Constitution’s legitimacy cannot 
neglect the general acknowledgment that it is supreme law—a requirement that applies to 
Presidents, legislators, judges, and ordinary citizens alike. Though often overlooked, this 
acknowledgment of the moral legitimacy of the Constitution, so artfully articulated by 
Marshall in Marbury, can be considered the indispensible bond that ties all Americans to 
its authority, in his time and our own. 
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Chapter Two 
 
John Marshall, McCulloch v. Maryland, and the Concept of Constitutional 
Sovereignty 
 
 John Marshall hated partisan politics. As Congressman, he worked tirelessly 
behind the scenes to achieve compromise during the contentious presidency of John 
Adams, leading his most famous biographer to commend his “independence of thought 
and action” as the defining characteristic of his brief time in office.106 As Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court, he sought to build the reputation of the Court as a refuge of 
impartiality and levelheaded thinking during the political storms of the first party system. 
And as the official chronicler of the nation’s first President, his Life Of Washington 
provides a portrait of a President whose devotion to country might be emulated by all 
citizens. Few figures of the founding era worked as consistently and self-consciously as 
he did to extend the patriotism of the American Revolution into the republic’s early 
years. 
 Marshall might therefore be chagrined to learn that with its bicentennial on the 
horizon, his famous Supreme Court opinion in the case of McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 
remains a perennial source of political argument. Recently, the opinion has proved 
especially attractive to both supporters and opponents of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), 
even as the legality of the ACA appears settled. Some, notably Akhil Reed Amar, have 
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lauded McCulloch for Marshall’s repeated reliance “not on explicit clauses but on the 
implicit meaning of the Constitution as a whole.”107 On these accounts, Marshall’s liberal 
construction of the powers of the national government chimes with his understanding of 
the document as “intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently to be adapted to 
the various crises of human affairs”—including one concerning healthcare.108 On the 
other hand, a number of scholars have approached McCulloch more cautiously, arguing 
that the ACA runs counter to Marshall’s defense of federalism and enumerated powers. 
As Robert Natelson and David Kopel argue, the opinion repeatedly emphasized a 
moderate and “fair” construction of the Constitution, which reserved to the states a 
limited but important domain of policymaking authority.109 Despite his best efforts to 
avoid partisan fervor in his own day, the ongoing debates concerning Marshall’s 
intentions in McCulloch are a testament to the case’s fractious legacy in American 
political discourse. 
 Healthcare reform provides only the latest installment in the war of words 
concerning Marshall’s intent in McCulloch. As Peter Smith has pointed out, “Decisions 
of the Marshall Court often provided something for everyone, and cases construing 
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Congress’s affirmative powers were no exception.” 110 Most scholars of the opinion have 
viewed it as an unambiguous defense of the powers of the national government, pointing 
to Marshall’s support for a broad interpretation of the Constitution’s words and his 
account of the document’s creation by the American people rather than the states.111 
Others have taken a more tempered view of McCulloch, contending that Marshall 
defended a notion of national power that reserved a significant amount of authority to the 
states.112 More recently, a more state-centered view has been advanced by Sotirios 
Barber, who has argued that McCulloch charted a “constitutional federalism” that 
represented a middle ground between states’ rights and a form of extreme nationalism 
that denied any limits on national legislative authority.113 But while these interpretations 
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arrive at different conclusions regarding the scope of Marshall’s nationalism and 
federalism, in general they tend to have one thing in common, which is their tendency to 
relegate Marshall’s theory of constitutional sovereignty to the periphery. 
 The Constitution’s sovereignty was hardly settled at the time of McCulloch. 
Indeed, it was a subject that few thinkers surveying the new political landscape could 
fully grasp. As Christian Fritz recently put it, following the Revolution “few disputed that 
the people would rule as the sovereign speaking through written constitutions. But in 
putting this idea into practice, Americans parted company with one another.”114 Even at 
the time of the Constitution’s ratification, Walter Bennett contends, the “nature and 
location of sovereignty” remained a concept “so elusive” that any argument making use 
of the term could be made to appear insufficient if not outright defective.115 For that 
matter, as Hugh Willis has shown, the creation of the practical expression of sovereignty 
remained open to debate well into the early nineteenth century.116 Moreover, as Willis 
describes, the Constitution’s status as representing the sovereign authority of the 
American people was a concept that took root in public opinion only gradually, 
comprising “long years of constitutional history and profound opinions of the United 
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States Supreme Court.”117 Few public figures played as significant a role in effecting this 
transformation as Marshall. 
 The neglect of Marshall’s constitutional theory in McCulloch is not the only 
omission that characterizes many analyses of the case. Although examinations of 
McCulloch typically begin and end with the opinion itself, this focus can tell one only so 
much. A more comprehensive assessment of McCulloch must thus turn to public 
commentary on the case. In the summer of 1819, Marshall articulated a defense of his 
McCulloch opinion in the popular press, the sole occasion in his long career of public 
service when he would engage in a journalistic discussion of any judicial decision.118 
Writing pseudonymously in a number of Virginia newspapers, he expanded on the 
Court’s opinion, defending it against the attacks of critics. Although these essays have 
been acknowledged by scholars as providing a more candid view of Marshall’s decision, 
their importance has been considerably undervalued. For the essays provide more than a 
mere defense or rationalization of McCulloch, and consist of far more than partisan 
bickering. Instead, they offer a full-fledged argument on behalf of Marshall’s concept of 
constitutional sovereignty.  
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McCulloch v. Maryland Revisited 
 The economically tumultuous years of the late eighteenth century provided the 
backdrop for McCulloch.119 When the twenty-year charter of the First Bank of the United 
States expired in 1811, the Republican Congress, which had always looked askance at the 
national bank for its centralizing tendencies, successfully blocked its renewal. But the 
financial strain of the War of 1812 reminded the nation of the need for a streamlined 
economic system, and the Bank was re-chartered in 1816 amid a wave of postwar 
nationalist euphoria. Upon its renewal, the Bank immediately began opening local 
branches throughout the country, ignoring objections raised by both private and state-
chartered institutions that anticipated a significant loss of business to the national 
branches. Such fears were soon realized: the Bank flourished as the nation’s major source 
of credit, and the backing of the federal government gave its branches a decided 
competitive advantage over their local counterparts. Within three years of its 
reincorporation, the Bank enjoyed widespread acclaim as a leading cause of the nation’s 
postwar economic boom.  
 By late 1818, however, Americans had largely turned against the Bank. Many 
branches were forced to recall loans at a rapid rate in order to offset a drop in American 
                                                 
 119The following reconstruction of McCulloch is culled from the narratives found in 
Stites, John Marshall: Defender of the Constitution, 129-136; Smith, John Marshall: Definer of a 
Nation, 440-445; and Simon, What Kind of Nation, 271-278. There are only two book-length 
scholarly treatments of McCulloch, to wit, Killenbeck, McCulloch v. Maryland: Securing a 
Nation, 2006 and Gunther’s volume. Good article-length overviews of the case are provided in 
David S. Bogen, “The Scandal of Smith and Buchanan: The Skeletons in the McCulloch v. 
Maryland Closet,” Maryland Law Forum 9.4 (1985), 125-132; A.L.L. Campbell, “ ‘It is a 
Constitution We Are Expounding’: Chief Justice Marshall and the ‘Necessary and Proper’ 
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commodity prices overseas. Additionally, instances of embezzlement, fraud, and general 
mismanagement by branch officials that often went ignored or unpunished by federal 
authorities further heightened local resentments.120 By 1819, several state legislatures had 
passed laws that attempted to curb the Bank’s influence within their respective states. 
Among these states was Maryland, which targeted the Bank by imposing a banknote tax 
or an annual $15,000 fee on the operations of all non-state-chartered banks. The cashier 
of the Baltimore branch of the Second Bank of the United States, James McCulloch, 
refused to pay either sum to the state, which prompted Maryland to file suit against the 
Second Bank. After a Baltimore county court and the state Court of Appeals upheld the 
Maryland law, the case of McCulloch v. Maryland was appealed to the Supreme Court on 
the basis of a writ of error filed by the Bank. 
 The Court soon sensed the gravity of the confrontation between state and national 
government, extending the duration of oral arguments to one week while allowing both 
the prosecution and defense an additional lawyer. Adding to public interest in the case 
was the impressive roster of attorneys. Congressman Joseph Hopkinson, U.S. Attorney 
for the District of Columbia Walter Jones, and state Attorney General Luther Martin 
would defend the state of Maryland, while United States Attorney General William Wirt, 
future Attorney General William Pinkney, and a young Daniel Webster represented the 
Second Bank. The courtroom was packed when the first of nine days of arguments began 
on February 22, 1818. The issues raised in the trial were hardly novel, but they were 
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argued passionately and in detail: counsel for Maryland defended a strict construction of 
the Constitution that emphasized the ultimate sovereignty of the states, while attorneys 
for the Bank defended the institution’s legitimacy by pointing to Congress’s implied 
powers as granted by the Constitution. 
 Marshall delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court on March 6, 1819, a mere 
three days after the trial’s closing arguments.121 The opinion raised and responded to two 
key questions. First, was Congress empowered to charter a national bank? And second, 
granting the constitutionality of the Second Bank, could Maryland lawfully impose a tax 
on one of its state branches?122 In what proved to be one of his lengthiest opinions as 
Chief Justice, Marshall carefully pursued both questions. The Court determined that the 
Bank’s incorporation was constitutional based on “a fair construction” of the Constitution 
and the implied powers of Congress.123 Next, the Court held that Maryland was 
prohibited from imposing any tax on a branch’s operation. While the state did exercise 
taxation power concurrently with the national government, that authority did not allow 
Maryland, or any state, to interfere with the laws of the national government pursuant to 
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the Constitution. Hence, Marshall concluded with respect to the state’s bank tax, “such a 
tax must be unconstitutional.”124  
 Public reaction to the McCulloch opinion varied widely by region. In the 
industrial North, where the Second Bank remained popular and the effects of the 
economic recession were milder, newspapers cast the Supreme Court’s decision in a 
favorable light, while in the South and West, editorials were more mixed in their tone. 
But in Marshall’s home state of Virginia, the backlash against the Marshall Court was 
especially fierce, led by powerful Democratic-Republican partisans in Richmond—the 
“Richmond Junto,” as they came to be known—that had long detested Marshall and saw 
McCulloch as the latest blow to Virginian sovereignty.125 The Junto’s chief complaint 
was not that Marshall had declared the Second Bank constitutional, but that he had 
justified Congress’ incorporation power in a manner that would render the states wholly 
subordinate to the political will of the national government.126 Turning to Marshall’s 
nationalist rhetoric in McCulloch shows that this criticism was not entirely unjustified.  
 
 
                                                 
 124Gunther, McCulloch, 50. 
 
 125Little is known of the Richmond Junto’s clandestine membership and operation. As 
Ellis (2007) notes, “Although there is a large body of literature on the Richmond Junto, there is 
no consensus among scholars about who its members were, how coherent it was, how it operated, 
how influential and powerful it was, its overall significance, and even whether it existed at all” 
(235-236). 
 
 126As Daniel Walker Howe notes, even stanch Jeffersonians had come around to endorse 
the Second Bank by 1816. See his What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 
1815-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 145. On the general political consensus 
on the Bank’s legitimacy, see also Klarman, “How Great Were The ‘Great’ Marshall Court 
Decisions?,” 1128-1129.  
 
 58 
 
McCulloch on national sovereignty  
 Sovereignty has long been understood to imply the presence of an ultimate 
political authority as one of its necessary attributes. It was certainly the widespread 
association of sovereignty with notions of consolidation, omnipotence, and unity that 
such luminaries as Hobbes, Bodin, and Grotius contemplated when formulating their 
distinct understandings of sovereign power as the unitary and indivisible promulgation of 
law. Similar concepts of indivisible sovereignty remained commonplace in the Anglo-
American world of the eighteenth century.127 Indeed, as Gordon Wood has described, 
even into the 1770s the belief in a supreme and absolute authority as a necessary attribute 
of government was taken for granted by most thinkers.128 Admittedly, by the time of the 
American Revolution some had begun to articulate a coherent concept of divided 
sovereignty. But even as late as 1787, as Forrest McDonald has shown, the concept 
remained ill defined. In fact, however much the new Constitution’s federal structure 
belied this abstract principle in practice, a stubborn belief persisted throughout the early 
years of the republic that any state must possess an ultimate site of political sovereignty. 
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As McDonald puts it, many Americans “who thought about the matter accepted the 
indivisibility of sovereignty as an abstract theoretical proposition,” even as local politics 
was increasingly being organized along the lines of “a de facto system of divided 
sovereignty.”129 
 McCulloch seems to offer an unequivocal defense of this principle. The clearest 
evidence appears in Marshall’s rejection of the many arguments made by the attorneys 
for Maryland on behalf of state sovereignty. During the trial, counsel for Maryland had 
insisted at length that the Constitution emanated not from the American people but from 
“the act of sovereign and independent States.”130 Accordingly, the powers of the national 
government were seen as subordinate to and revocable by the will of the states, “who 
alone are truly sovereign” and “possess supreme dominion.” Stating that “it would be 
difficult to sustain” this interpretation of the Constitution’s origins, Marshall spent much 
of McCulloch arguing against this states’ rights doctrine and in support of a more 
nationalist interpretation of the Constitution’s creation. While it was true that the framers 
may have been elected by state legislatures, Marshall argued, the proposed Constitution 
that emerged from Philadelphia nonetheless required ratification. To become the nation’s 
supreme law, it first had to gain the approval of the American people, who were “at 
perfect liberty to accept or reject” the Constitution, acting upon it “in the only manner in 
which they can act safely, effectively and wisely, on such a subject -- by assembling in 
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convention.”131 State ratifying conventions hardly indicated the ultimate sovereignty of 
the individual states, but were instead a concession to the impossibility of “breaking 
down the lines which separate the States” and ratifying the Constitution en masse.132 But 
this mode of adoption did not detract from the Constitution’s authority as proceeding 
“directly from the people.” As Marshall declared, the document was “ordained and 
established in the name of the people,” and represented “emphatically and truly, a 
Government of the people.” The Constitution was in both “form and substance” ratified 
by the will of the people, not the will of the states; its framing represented a national 
decision, not a combination of judgments rendered by a myriad of independent 
sovereigns.133  
 Marshall’s theory of the Constitution’s ratification went hand-in-glove with his 
argument on behalf of the authority of the national government. His argument began with 
a discussion of those aspects of the Constitution that indicated its national sovereignty. 
Because the people intended the Constitution to institute “effective government” and not 
a mere league between sovereign states, the powers of the national government were “to 
be exercised directly” on the people, “and for their benefit.”134 In matters of textual 
interpretation, and particularly with regard to the question of the Bank’s constitutionality, 
this intention entailed giving the words of the Constitution a construction befitting a 
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national document. While acknowledging that among the enumerated powers of the 
Constitution, “we do not find that of establishing a bank or creating a corporation,” and 
conceding that neither the words “Bank” nor “incorporation” appeared anywhere in the 
Constitution, he nevertheless sharply disagreed with Maryland’s argument that the Bank 
was thus illegitimate, arguing that if adopted, its narrow construction of the Constitution 
would so weaken Congress that its explicit powers “would be nugatory.”135 Instead, the 
intention of the American people “to form a more perfect union” and establish a national 
government “conducive to their happiness” meant “ample means” must be given to the 
government to execute its constitutional powers and duties.136 The incorporation of the 
Bank, as well as the implementation of state branches, represented a legitimate “choice of 
means” to execute the powers granted by the Constitution to effect the public good.137  
 Having defended the constitutionality of the Bank, Marshall then turned to the 
legality of the Maryland bank tax. It was here that he dealt a direct blow to the hopes of 
Maryland and its doctrine of state sovereignty. While granting that the states exercised 
taxation powers concurrently with the national government, he claimed the Constitution 
could restrain even this “vital” authority in cases where its use was “in its nature 
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incompatible with, and repugnant to, the constitutional laws of the Union.”138 Counsel for 
the Bank had argued the Maryland tax was just such a case, and Marshall agreed, noting 
the Bank’s “claim has been sustained on a principle which so entirely pervades the 
Constitution, is so intermixed with the materials which compose it, so interwoven with its 
web, so blended with its texture, as to be incapable of being separated from it without 
rending it into shreds.”139 This fundamental principle, he continued, “is that the 
Constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme; that they control the 
Constitution and laws of the respective States, and cannot be controlled by them.” Such a 
“great principle,” which according to Marshall might “be almost termed an axiom,” 
entailed three corollary rules; first, “that a power to create implies a power to preserve;” 
second, “that a power to destroy, if wielded by a different hand, is hostile to, and 
incompatible with these powers to create and to preserve;” and finally, “that, where this 
repugnancy exists, that authority which is supreme must control, not yield to that over 
which it is supreme.” Connecting these rules to the case at hand entailed a clear 
conclusion: the Maryland tax imposed on the operations of the Second Bank was 
unconstitutional.  
 Couched within Marshall’s practical conclusions in McCulloch are his more 
theoretical beliefs concerning the sovereignty of the national government. Marshall 
claimed that on those occasions when national and state power came into conflict, it was 
crucial to the nation that the “authority which is supreme must control, not yield to that 
                                                 
 138Ibid., 41, 42. 
 139Ibid., 42. 
 
 63 
 
over which it is supreme.”140 For Marshall, it was clear that the national government was 
the supreme controlling political power in the United States that must not yield. Thus the 
Chief Justice forcefully declared that the states “have no power, by taxation or otherwise, 
to retard, impede, burthen, or in any manner control the operations of the constitutional 
laws enacted by Congress to carry into effect the powers vested in the national 
Government.”141 This proposition concerning the government’s sovereignty was an 
irrefutable truth, however much it was denied by states rights’ supporters in everyday 
politics. Indeed, Marshall emphasized, it was of “the very essence of supremacy” to 
remove any and all “obstacles to its action within its own sphere, and so to modify every 
power vested in subordinate governments” that would interfere with the exercise of its 
influence. This principle of supremacy, he added, must always be kept in view when 
“construing” the Constitution.142 Marshall thus defended a justification of Congress’ 
implied power that gave the national government robust power. And he struck down a 
state law that aimed to limit the reach of national policy. Yet these facts do not comprise 
the whole of Marshall’s theory of sovereignty. Indeed, they do not even tell the full story 
of McCulloch.  
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McCulloch on federalism 
 Political sovereignty has not always been defined in absolute and unitary terms.143 
As early as 1774, the possibility of federal and confederal political arrangements were 
being proposed with great fervor by radical republicans in the American colonies.144 As 
Bernard Bailyn has shown, because these thinkers placed ultimate sovereign authority in 
the hands of the people, they were able to see it in more complex and multidimensional 
terms, so that with independence they were free to experiment with more dispersed 
political and legal power.145 By 1787, federalism had become an accepted principle, 
clearly expressed by Madison in his Federalist #39, where he argued that states were “no 
more subject, within their respective spheres, to the general authority, than the general 
authority is subject to them, within its own sphere.”146 Yet such statements aside, 
federalism in the early republic created new dilemmas, as jurisdictional challenges 
involving state and national government grew throughout the 1790s.147 Hence 
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constitutional thinkers were faced with the challenge of elaborating a coherent conception 
of federalism, a challenge that Marshall sought to meet in McCulloch. Indeed, Ira 
Strauber has gone so far as to call the opinion “the classic statement” of American 
federalism, “a weave of pragmatic and political theoretical arguments about 
underdetermined sovereignty interests that mute the force of arguments for state and 
shared sovereignty without, however, altogether undermining claims for state power.”148  
 Two arguments were central to Marshall’s defense of federalism in McCulloch: 
the limitations the Constitution imposed on national law and the coordinate legislative 
powers exercised by both national and state government. He begins with the restrictions 
the Constitution placed on national policymaking. Though McCulloch put forward a 
broad reading of congressional power in its justification of the Second Bank, it did not 
extend to Congress free rein to pass any law that might be tangentially related to its 
constitutional powers. Limitations on Congressional authority did exist, the opinion 
stressed, and it was the responsibility of the Court to enforce those limits whenever they 
were breached. Marshall’s statement of this commitment occurs in his discussion of the 
implied powers of Congress. All must admit, he announced, that the powers of the 
national government were limited, and that such limits “are not to be transcended.”149 In 
this regard, he cited a number of provisos governing the constitutional legality of any 
given piece of legislation. The first condition governed the object or end of legislation, 
which must be “legitimate” and “within the scope of the Constitution.” Simply meeting 
                                                 
 148Ira Strauber, Neglected Policies: Constitutional Law and Legal Commentary as Civic 
Education (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 109. 
 
 149Gunther, McCulloch, 38. 
 
 66 
 
this threshold, however, did not guarantee the constitutionality of legislation. A second 
provision went further, declaring that the only means that may be employed by Congress 
to implement legitimate objects were those “which are appropriate, which are plainly 
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the 
Constitution, are Constitutional.”150 Moreover, judgment of both the ends of legislation 
and the means to achieve those ends fell to the Supreme Court. This body, Marshall 
declared, would render the final determination as to whether legislation fulfilled these 
two conditions, and its affirmative judgment on the constitutionality of the Second Bank 
could very well change in future cases. As Marshall warned, should Congress “adopt 
measures which are prohibited by the Constitution” or “pass laws not intrusted to the 
Government,” then “it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case 
requiring such a decision come before it, to say that such an act was not the law of the 
land.”151  
 The national government protected federalism in another way. Congress, Marshall 
suggested, was not the only political power states had to fear. As he pointed out, a 
national legislature afforded to each individual state protection from the invasions of 
another state. Noting the fact that “in the Legislature of the Union alone are all 
represented,” he held that it was only reasonable that Congress rather than the states was 
entrusted with the power of controlling those “measures which concern all.”152 Jealous of 
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its power, one state would hardly turn over to another state the authority to control even 
the most insignificant of its operations, let alone the power of taxation. To solve this 
impasse, the national government would be entrusted with those matters that concerned 
all citizens, and like state legislatures, its representatives would be held accountable by 
the citizens of the United States for abusing that trust. Thus since “the people of all the 
States, and the States themselves, are represented in Congress,” a state interfering with 
the operations of the national government acted not only upon its own constituents but 
also attacked other states and those “people over whom they claim no control.”153 As 
regional distinctions at the time of McCulloch continued to grow more pronounced, this 
was hardly an insignificant function of the nation’s political institutions. 
 Proceeding to his second argument, Marshall allowed that the states were not only 
protected by the federal system: they possessed considerable power and autonomy of 
their own under its aegis. In particular, state governments retained a pivotal set of 
political powers to regulate their domestic affairs. Indeed, to the extent that state law did 
not conflict with the paramount law of the Constitution, all such laws were legitimate and 
due full obedience. The opinion went out of its way to emphasize that even the power of 
taxation was reserved to the states, notwithstanding the Court’s particular annulment of 
the Maryland bank tax. As Marshall reminded his readers, “the power of taxation is one 
of vital importance” and “is retained by the States.”154 Neither the Supreme Court nor the 
Constitution had altered the exercise of this power by the state governments: “that it is 
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not abridged by the grant of a similar power to the Government of the Union; [and] that it 
is to be concurrently exercised by the two Governments” were not merely opinions, but 
“truths” which had “never been denied” by the Court.155  
 Thus the Maryland tax was not invalidated because it trespassed upon a power 
that belonged exclusively to the national government. For Marshall, the illegality of the 
tax turned on its specific disruption of the operations of the Second Bank, “an instrument 
employed by the Government of the Union to carry its powers into execution.”156 The 
Court’s decision may have been quite different had the Maryland law not posed such a 
direct threat to national law. Indeed, sounding a note of reassurance to the states, 
Marshall emphasized that the McCulloch verdict had not changed the basic balance of 
power between the states and the national government as defined by the Constitution. The 
Court’s ruling, he declared, “does not deprive the States of any resources which they 
originally possessed.” Apparently in a spirit of friendly support, Marshall even went so 
far as to list constitutionally valid forms of taxation that were at Maryland’s disposal: the 
real property of the bank as well as interest held by its customers were both fit objects of 
state taxation, “in common with other property of the same description throughout the 
state.” These remarks suffice to show that Marshall did not simply dismiss either the role 
of the states or state legislatures as integral pieces of the constitutional order. For 
Marshall, political power was distributed and shared between state and national 
government. He may have attached special importance to the supremacy of national law 
in light of the animosity toward the Bank seen in the public opposition to it, but in 
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defending the Bank he was careful not to undermine the legitimacy of state banks or the 
valid measures state governments might institute to limit its influence. Seen in this light, 
the crux of McCulloch was not Marshall’s nationalism, but his nuanced theory of 
federalism. 
Beyond nationalism and federalism: Defining constitutional sovereignty 
 
 Nevertheless, Marshall’s constitutionalism cannot be captured by the language of 
nationalism or federalism alone. For Marshall, neither the powers nor the policies of 
government stood as the nation’s supreme legal authority. Instead, this authority 
belonged to the Constitution itself. Marshall’s theory of constitutional sovereignty is 
implicit in McCulloch, but is brought into greater light in the essays that he wrote in its 
wake. The first two of these pseudonymous essays, written by “A Friend to the Union,” 
appeared in the Philadelphia Union and the Alexandria Gazette. Nine others, by “A 
Friend to the Constitution,” soon followed in the Gazette and Alexandria Daily.157 In 
these articles, Marshall set forth a spirited defense of McCulloch that was at once precise 
and comprehensive. Nor were the essays purely partisan in their content, as we might 
expect from their popular political setting. Rather, they reflect the depth of seriousness 
the Chief Justice showed toward public perceptions of the Supreme Court in particular 
and the Constitution in general. Worried that the words of Virginia’s states’ rights 
proponents would prove fatal to the Constitution if left unanswered, Marshall 
meticulously justified McCulloch decision and defended the reputation of the Supreme 
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Court. But of even greater significance, these articles represent a robust argument on 
behalf of the Constitution’s sovereignty.158 
 One does not need to look far to see what events motivated Marshall to write and 
publish the essays. When he returned to his Richmond home in the summer of 1819, 
animosity toward the Supreme Court in the state of Virginia was running at a fever pitch. 
On March 30th, the pro-Democratic-Republican Richmond Enquirer entered the fray. By 
way of introduction, Thomas Ritchie, the paper’s editor-in-chief, announced to readers 
that a series of essays would appear in the coming weeks responding to the “alarming 
errors” of the Supreme Court.159 The first two essays that appeared were most likely 
written by Virginia Judge William Brockenbrough, a partisan defender of Virginia 
sovereignty, employing the pen name “Amphictyon.” Then, beginning on June 11th, four 
more articles were published warning readers of the danger the Marshall Court posed to 
the states, this time authored by Judge Spencer Roane of the Virginia Court of Appeals 
(and son-in-law of Patrick Henry), who employed the pen name “Hampden.” By mid-
summer, encouraged by a resolution passed by the Virginia legislature repudiating the 
McCulloch decision, public criticism of the case was escalating into open defiance of the 
Court’s decision. Marshall followed this turn of events anxiously. As he confided to his 
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fellow justice Joseph Story, “our opinion in the bank case has roused the sleeping spirit of 
Virginia—if indeed it ever sleeps.” Correctly predicting the opinion would be “attacked 
in the papers with some asperity,” he went on to lament that the Court’s supporters 
“never write for the public.” By leaving the field to those who would cast the opinion in 
the worst possible light, he feared, the opinion would soon “be considered as damnably 
heretical.” It was true that the newspaper attacks were directed primarily toward the 
national government in general and the Bank and the Supreme Court in particular. But 
the consequences of the argument, in Marshall’s view, led inexorably toward 
undermining the Constitution. Concerned that the very existence of the still-fragile 
Constitution was at stake, Marshall made a decision: he would not let the battery of 
attacks pass in silence.160  
 While seeking to take the higher ground in defending the Constitution’s 
sovereignty, Marshall was not afraid to throw a punch. He began by considering the 
stakes in the case. Writing as “A Friend of the Constitution,” he warned that great 
constitutional questions must sometimes require “a course of intricate and abstruse 
reasoning, which it requires no inconsiderable degree of mental exertion to 
comprehend.”161 Thus the Court’s opinions could be easily and grossly misrepresented, 
and the case of McCulloch in particular presented “the fairest occasion for wounding 
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mortally, the vital powers of the government, thro’ its judiciary.” Then he turned to 
Brockenbrough and Roane. Combating the “weighty interests & deep rooted prejudices” 
that he saw as motivating the assault on the Court, Marshall responded to Roane’s 
“ranting declamation,” with its “rash impeachment” of the integrity of the Court, 
contrasting it with his own dispassionate “investigation of truth.” Clearly, he realized that 
his opponents were not interested in a convivial discussion of principles, and both the 
tone and content of his writings reflect the acrimony of the occasion. Yet even while 
parrying his critics’ charges in point-by-point detail, distinctive themes of his 
constitutionalism emerge. First, the Constitution was an abstract charter of government 
created by all Americans who saw the national government as accomplishing objects that 
affected all citizens. Second, its supremacy was a matter of practical necessity: any state 
required an ultimate source of political authority. Finally, the Constitution secured rather 
than undermined the principles of limited government and federalism that were held dear 
by all citizens. These lines of argument form the core of Marshall’s defense of 
McCulloch and, just as important, his understanding of the Constitution’s sovereignty.  
 In order to understand Marshall’s constitutionalism, one must first consider his 
definition of the Constitution. To be sure, Marshall revealed some of this picture in 
McCulloch. There he had famously described the Constitution as a document as one 
“intended to endure for ages to come,” and so must “be adapted to the various crises of 
human affairs” lest it become “a splendid bauble.”162 By its nature, it was a document of 
abstract principles, and thus “only its great outlines” could be marked and “its important 
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objects” assigned.163 Setting forth in intricate detail the actions that the national 
government could and could not perform would reduce the Constitution to “the prolixity 
of a legal code” scarcely comprehensible to the human mind. Writing as  “Friend,” 
however, Marshall went further than simply to claim the Court must be flexible in its 
interpretation of this inevitably abstract document. First and foremost, the Constitution 
was created through a partnership between fellow citizens, not a peace agreement among 
sworn opponents. Such “a contract between enemies seeking each other’s destruction” 
would make its parties “anxious to insert every particular, lest a watchful adversary 
should take advantage of the omission.” Moreover, the Constitution was not akin to a 
zero-sum agreement between private individuals “wherein implications in favor of one 
man impair[ed] the vested rights of another.” Hence, it differed from “the cases put in the 
books of the common law,” which were unconcerned with constitutional government. In 
positive terms, the Constitution “is the act of a people, creating a government without 
which they cannot exist as a people.” The powers they granted to the national 
government were exercised for the benefit of the people by those representatives “chosen 
for that purpose.” An excessively minimalist reading of Congressional power would 
defeat the Constitution’s purpose as “a general system for all future times to be adapted 
by those who administer it.” Reiterating that “from its nature, such an instrument can 
describe only the great objects it is intended to accomplish, and state in general terms the 
specific powers which are deemed necessary for those objects, ” Marshall described 
members of Congress as ultimately beholden to its rule, not to their own. To fulfill the 
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“great objects” set forth in the Constitution, the office of a legislature is created, and as an 
emanation of the people, it was responsible for marking, “according to the judgment of 
the nation,” its course “within those great outlines which are given in the constitution.”164  
 Marshall also viewed the Constitution as playing a creative role in solidifying 
American national identity. Having denied that the union was simply a product of 
individual states, he now claimed that it was the Constitution that had given Americans a 
new “theoretical or constitutional existence.”165 On those occasions dealing with 
“national affairs,” such as matters of war and peace, this identity was most evident. But 
the language of the Constitution also suggested that its existence was both more 
pervasive and more commonplace. Hence, Marshall pointed out, a Senator must have 
been a “citizen of the United States” for seven years, and the oath taken by every adopted 
citizen was to the United States. Such provisions proved, in his words, that “we are all 
citizens, not only of our particular states, but also of this great republic.” The Constitution 
was much more than a document that specified the exercise of legitimate political 
authority. As a written testament to the national identity of the American people, it played 
a formative role in constructing an enduring constitutional citizenship that could not be 
confined to the vocabulary of either national or state membership. 
 Marshall was careful to emphasize that so long as the Constitution governed the 
nation’s affairs, a despotic national government was a mere bogeyman conjured by the 
Constitution’s opponents. Dispelling this imagined threat entailed reframing the basic 
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terms employed by its foes. Though Roane had consistently “confounded supremacy with 
despotism,” Marshall argued that supremacy simply meant “highest in authority,” an 
authority that may or may not abuse its legitimate powers.166 Turning to the constitutional 
text, he asked: “Is not the government of the union, ‘within its sphere of action,’ 
‘supreme,’ or ‘highest in authority’? This is certainly the fact, and is certainly the 
language of the Constitution.” After all, Marshall went on, in national affairs “what 
authority is above it?”167 But the supremacy of the national government was not 
unbridled. Instead, its laws were anchored to those limitations imposed by the 
Constitution, which could itself be amended. As he reminded his readers, “The 
constitution may be changed, any constitution may be changed.”168 Laws could be altered 
and reformed, unlike despotic power, which operated unhindered by popular checks or 
institutional balances. Marshall’s response to Roane’s portrayal of an all-powerful 
national government was as calming as it was direct: so long as it remained the nation’s 
supreme law, the Constitution secured all Americans from the possibility of a tyrannical 
national government.  
 The Constitution’s protection of the principle of federalism supplies the final 
pillar of Marshall’s newspaper defense of McCulloch. A core narrative for both 
Maryland’s as well as Brockenbrough’s argument against the Bank was the notion that 
the states, not the American people, had authorized the Constitution. Brockenbrough had 
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gone to great lengths to prove that the several states “not only gave birth to the 
constitution, but its life depended on the existence of the state governments.”169 For 
evidence, he looked to the historical record of the Constitution’s creation: the federal 
convention was populated by delegates appointed by the state legislatures; the document 
was submitted for ratification to state conventions; and such conventions represented the 
states acting ”in their highest political, and sovereign authority.” For Brockenbrough, 
there could be no mistake: the Constitution “was adopted and brought into existence” by 
the states, who had surrendered none of their original sovereignty upon its ratification. 
Citing the example of Rhode Island’s initial reluctance to ratify, he noted that the 
Constitution was not binding on any state, even the smallest in population, until that state 
had given its free consent. In distorting the Constitution’s ratification, he continued, the 
Court had substituted the American people rather than the states as the authentic source 
of the Constitution’s authority. This seemingly benign principle risked leaving a minority 
of Americans at the mercy of majority rule—or majority tyranny—as exercised by all 
citizens, no matter the state.170  
 For Marshall, Brockenbrough was tilting at windmills. Nobody had denied that 
the states played an important political role under the Constitution, just as they had under 
the Articles of Confederation. But Brockenbrough’s more serious error was his conflation 
of the term “national” with “consolidation.”171 The principle that the United States was a 
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federal and not a consolidated government was “universally known and universally 
admitted. No person in his senses ever has, ever will, or ever can controvert it.”172  
Brockenbrough had hastily assumed that this fundamental fact had been renounced by the 
Court along with compact theory. For Marshall, the nature and language of a legal 
document, not its mode of adoption, were the characteristics that determined its identity. 
The Constitution depended “not on its being adopted by the people acting in a single 
body, or in single bodies.” If that notion were true, the kingdoms of Great Britain and 
Ireland would not be considered a consolidated kingdom, since they at one time 
comprised three distinct kingdoms. Rather, “the character of a government depends on its 
constitution.”173    
 If the mode of adoption did not determine the type of government the nation had, 
what other principle might determine the authority of the Constitution? For Marshall, the 
language of the document itself must be considered in order to establish the type of 
political and legal order it envisioned for the nation. As he put it, “the words of an 
instrument, unless there be some sinister design which shuns the light, will always 
represent the intention of those who frame it.”174 And the words of the Constitution’s 
preamble could not be clearer in declaring that the Constitution was the creation of the 
American people, and not the several states. In his words, “an instrument intended to be 
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the act of the people, will purport to be the act of the people,” while conversely, “an 
instrument intended to be the act of the states, will purport to be the act of the states.” 
Thus the Constitution clearly cast the people as those who create and define the 
government, while the Articles of Confederation “was intended to be the act of the states, 
and was drawn in language comporting with that intention.”175 The difference between 
the respective origins of these documents could hardly have been more stark. It was 
entirely evident, he concluded, that “our constitution is not a league. It is a government; 
and has all the constituent powers of a government.”176  
 Like his opponents, Marshall was not above employing rhetorical flourishes to 
warn his readers of the consequences of rejecting the Constitution’s sovereignty. 
Disregarding its supreme authority would have untold consequences, not the least of 
which would be throwing the country into a state of anarchy even more perilous than 
conditions under the Articles of Confederation. It is not inconceivable, Marshall mused, 
“that the constitution may be so expounded by its enemies as to become totally 
inoperative.”177 The only way to appease critics of McCulloch, Marshall imagined, would 
be to allow the individual states to pass judgment on each law proposed by the national 
government and consequently clog the political process. Thus “a new mode of 
amendment, by way of report of committees of a state legislature and resolutions thereon, 
may pluck from” the Constitution “power after power” in piecemeal fashion. 
                                                 
 175See Gunther, “Marshall’s ‘A Friend to the Union’ Essays,” in John Marshall’s 
Defense, 78-105: 85.  
 
 176Gunther, “Friend of the Constitution,” 199. 
 
 177Ibid., 160. 
 
 79 
 
Alternatively, some state legislatures may instead choose to “sweep off the whole” 
Constitution and the powers it bestowed in its entirely, substituting in its place the 
“scanty and inconvenient means” the national government might employ to fulfill its 
great responsibilities. But whether the powers of the national government were reduced 
gradually or all at once, the result of leaving to the states the power of constitutional 
authority and interpretation would be the same. Under such circumstances, Marshall 
admonished, the state governments would eviscerate the document, leaving the 
Constitution “an inanimate corpse, incapable of effecting any of its objects.” A far safer 
course would be to entrust judgments of constitutionality to the Supreme Court, Marshall 
claimed, for there was no body or tribunal less liable to be “swayed by unworthy 
motives” from the performance of its duties on behalf of advancing public prosperity.178 
Behind the veil of anonymity, the Chief Justice minced no words: the Court was the best 
defense against the failure of the Constitution. 
 With regard to McCulloch, Marshall’s Gazette essays underscore familiar themes 
while drawing attention to new ones in his political thought. For Marshall, the 
Constitution represented much more than a new legal order. It symbolized the virtue and 
integrity of the American people, standing as a reminder to new generations of the 
patriotism that led to its creation. In making this argument, Marshall would drop his 
characteristic detachment as Chief Justice, driving his argument home in vivid and 
passionate terms. Seeing the “weakness” of the Articles of Confederation, he claimed, the 
American people had chosen to “cement” their fragile union by means of a new national 
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charter. Their decision to change the Articles “into an effective government” was a 
testament to the “wisdom and patriotism of our country,” freeing the American people 
from political difficulties that would only reappear with the restoration of states’ rights 
doctrine.179 As Marshall summarizes in his concluding essay, more than the scope of 
Congressional authority was at stake in McCulloch. The attacks on the Court were 
“intended to produce a very serious effect,” one that in his judgment could lead to the 
Constitution’s “utter subversion,” in which its sovereignty was prostrated “at the feet of 
its members.180 Roane’s states-rights diatribes threatened the powers of national 
government and the principles of federalism. But beyond even these dangers, still more 
was at stake in McCulloch. For as Marshall saw it, the Constitution itself was imperiled 
by the states’ rights rhetoric. To overturn the concept of constitutional sovereignty, he 
believed, was to put at risk the nascent nation the framers had worked so diligently to 
construct. Indeed, without constitutional sovereignty, the nation would have no ultimate 
law at all. Whether writing as Chief Justice or “A Friend to the Constitution,” Marshall 
was determined not to allow that to occur without a fight. 
Conclusion 
 No matter how closely scrutinized, Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch will 
continue to be a source of debate. Many nationalist interpretations of the opinion will 
continue to minimize Marshall’s defense of state authority and limitations on national 
policy, while arguments that emphasize Marshall’s federalism will continue to understate 
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his concern for a robust national government with the capability to execute its laws. But 
these interpretations must acknowledge that the keystone of Marshall’s political thought 
was neither nationalism nor federalism, but constitutionalism. After all, in McCulloch it 
was the Constitution, not the national government, whose principles must “be adapted to 
the various crises of human affairs.”181 It was the Constitution, not the states, that was the 
nation’s ultimate legal authority. It was the Constitution, not the political branches—not 
even the Supreme Court—that was a lever for governance, not “a splendid bauble.”182 
And it was the prevention of the subversion of the Constitution, “that grand effort of 
wisdom, virtue, and patriotism,” that induced Marshall to risk criticism by taking his 
argument in McCulloch public.183  
 Only by turning to Marshall’s Gazette essays do we see the full picture of his 
underlying theory of constitutional sovereignty in McCulloch. Only by reading both his 
legal and political opinions can we appreciate the full reach of his political thought. And 
only by attempting to understand his thought within this broader context can we see 
Marshall’s overarching commitment to the Constitution. The essays reveal a different 
side of the Chief Justice than the persona he projected from the bench, one that shows 
him concerned with solidifying the sovereignty of the Constitution in the court of law and 
the court of public opinion alike. The real threat to the United States, he continually 
emphasized, came from those whose theories would return the country to the political 
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disarray that plagued the nation under the Articles of Confederation. So long as the 
Constitution remained supreme law, he believed, state governments as well as the 
nation’s political branches had little reason to fear political authority. 
 As Americans continue to debate the contemporary significance of McCulloch for 
understanding the relationship between federal and state authority, we would do well to 
keep in mind Marshall’s commitment to the Constitution’s sovereignty. As the healthcare 
debate shows, the question of where state authority ends and national authority begins is 
one that continues to provoke considerable debate. But unacknowledged by nearly all the 
recent appropriations of McCulloch is the full story of the case. Marshall’s view of the 
Constitution’s sovereignty points to the need for more disciplined inquiry into his 
constitutionalism as it appeared not simply in his Supreme Court opinions, but outside the 
realm of the Court as well. His essays in the popular press show that he believed the 
Constitution’s sovereignty could provide common ground for proponents of a strong 
national government as well as principled federalists. Thus interpretations of McCulloch 
that rely exclusively on either nationalism or federalism fail to capture its fuller meaning. 
After all, Chief Justice Marshall never pledged his utmost loyalty to the national 
government. Nor was federalism the principal object of his devotion. We must never 
forget that above all else the object he was expounding—and defending—was the 
Constitution. 
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Chapter Three 
 
John Marshall, Ogden v. Saunders, and the Character of Neo-Republican Liberty 
 
 No Supreme Court justice had as much an impact on the legal foundations of the 
American economy as John Marshall. Many of his most memorable opinions bear on 
matters related to economic development. In Fletcher v. Peck (1810), he defended the 
sanctity of the Contract Clause against attempts by the state of Georgia to repeal the sale 
of millions of acres of land in the Yazoo River territory. In Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward (1819), he supported Dartmouth College against political efforts to alter the 
institution’s private charter, in doing so laying the groundwork for the expansion of 
private corporate enterprise free from the meddling of state legislatures. And in Gibbons 
v. Ogden (1824), he struck down a New York steamboat monopoly, in turn affirming the 
authority of Congress to regulate commerce between the states. Francis Stites minced no 
words when describing the Chief Justice’s economic philosophy. While the states 
possessed “some power over economic development,” Marshall believed that when 
individual state and national economic interests conflicted, “the Supreme Court would 
make the final choice” concerning which interest prevailed. From where Marshall sat, 
that choice was clear: “National supremacy and economic policy went hand in hand.”184 
            As a result of Marshall’s influence in such cases, it is all too common to overlook 
those rare occasions when his legal views on commerce failed to carry the day. Ogden v. 
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Saunders (1827) was perhaps the most important of those instances, marking Marshall’s 
only dissent on a constitutional question in his thirty-four years on the nation’s high 
court. The background of the case involved the technical details of contract law and 
default, but for Marshall, much larger stakes were involved. The case, he believed, went 
to the philosophical heart of the nation’s liberal and republican foundations. But of even 
greater significance, the survival of the Constitution itself was jeopardized by the Court’s 
decision. In Ogden, Marshall registered more than mild disagreement concerning the 
extent of contractual obligation. He examined the power of contract alongside the duty of 
performance, and anchored these concepts to the constitutional republicanism he saw as 
essential for securing the nation’s burgeoning economy. 
 Students of Marshall’s thought have long emphasized his devotion to classical 
liberal principles, notably the protection of property rights and a free market economy. 
Vernon Parrington noted that the "two fixed conceptions which dominated Marshall 
during his long career on the bench were the sovereignty of the federal state and the 
sanctity of private property.”185 Similarly, Max Lerner argued that Marshall sought “to 
fight the battles of the propertied group”, securing private property rights “from 
governmental encroachment.”186 The decision of Ogden v. Saunders in particular has 
been seen as a hallmark of his classical liberalism. Robert Faulkner sees his Ogden 
dissent as “beset with difficulties” but suggests that, when “pruned of its problems,” its 
conclusion is that free commerce must be limited only “according to the needs of 
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commerce itself and of a commercial society.” Marshall was convinced, Faulkner claims, 
that the public interest is served by fundamental laissez faire, by essentially free 
exchange.”187 Joseph Konefsky echoes a similar point of view in his discussion of Ogden, 
asserting that it was Marshall’s conviction “that it was the duty of the Supreme Court to 
protect America’s economic community.”188 Richard K. Matthews seems to agree: while 
noting that there are several “not necessarily incompatible” interpretations of Marshall’s 
constitutional thought, he argues that “in the end, his liberalism wins out” and concludes 
that like “Hobbes, Locke, Hamilton, and Madison, Marshall is a nondemocratic 
liberal.”189 Finally, Peter Irons has argued that Marshall protected property rights by 
interpreting the Constitution selectively, protecting private property with a liberal 
construction but adopting a restrictive construction with regard to individual rights.190 
 Others have viewed Marshall as a thoroughly republican thinker. In contrast to 
those who emphasize his commitment to personal rights, these thinkers stress his concern 
with public duty. According to Walter Berns, Marshall was “the greatest of the Supreme 
Court’s republican schoolmasters,” who identified constitutionality with the great figures 
of the founding period who provided a model of selflessness and patriotism that all 
citizens might approximate on a smaller scale.191 More recently, R. Kent Newmyer finds 
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a “republican dimension” even in Ogden v. Saunders. “Call it morality, duty, or honor, 
Marshall believed those individuals who shared the benefits of the contract culture were 
also fully responsible for the contracts they made. And it was the duty of the law to make 
them so.”192 This emphasis is on duty is echoed by another leading Marshall scholar, 
Thomas Shevroy, who argues that Marshall’s republicanism saw a divided political 
world, “between the elements of virtue, goodness, and stable political order on the one 
hand, and those of vice, avarice, and passion on the other.” The only viable force to 
counteract the latter phenomena was the willingness of the American people to dutifully 
follow the Constitution, a legal framework he believed created “dikes” preventing 
political passions “from overwhelming stable order, at least for a time.”193 As Edward 
White put it, one of the main projects of the Court during the early nineteenth century 
was “that of preserving, perfecting, and modifying the exceptional American version of 
republicanism” evinced during the American Revolution.”194 For these authors, 
Marshall’s republicanism emphasized citizens’ obligations to the rule of law and one 
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another, and one of his foremost objectives was to preserve a sense of duty to one’s 
country and its Constitution in a time when threats to the nation were subtler than the gun 
barrel. 
 In recent years, some scholars have taken a more measured approach to 
Marshall’s thought, arguing that his views were bound neither to rights-based liberalism 
nor republican values. According to these authors, liberal conceptions of rights and 
republican notions of responsibility possessed little conceptual clarity during the 
politically tumultuous years of the Marshall Court. Arguing against those who would cast 
Marshall as a modern liberal, Bruce Ackerman suggests that those interpretations that 
would cast Marshall as a liberal miss their mark, noting “it would be laughable to assert 
that Alexander Hamilton and John Marshall did all the really tough work in elaborating 
the constitution of the modern welfare state.”195 On the other hand, James Ely contends 
that Marshall’s emphasis on property rights was hardly atypical, but simply was a 
reflection of “principles generally recognized as legitimate" by most Americans. On his 
view, the Court’s decisions were part and parcel of "a broad consensus supportive of 
private property and contractual arrangements." Far from representing a courageous 
stance in defense of property rights, Ely suggests Marshall’s constitutional opinions 
appealed to “widely accepted norms” on those occasions when lawmakers “deviated from 
these principles.”196 In a similar vein, Stephen Siegel questions whether Marshall and his 
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colleagues on the Court possessed any coherent and unified theory of private property, a 
term that was characterized by confusion during Marshall’s time.197 
 These more subtle treatments of Marshall’s constitutionalism notwithstanding, 
few scholars have given his dissent in Ogden the serious consideration it deserves. This 
neglect leads to an incomplete understanding of Marshall’s views on contract rights and 
state bankruptcy legislation. More important, it fails to appreciate how Marshall moved 
beyond the categories of both classical liberalism and classical republicanism to defend a 
distinctive neo-republican a theory characterized by the protection of individual liberties 
and the dangers of political domination. To understand Marshall as a political thinker, 
one must firmly grasp his assimilation of elements of the liberal and republican traditions. 
But one must also appreciate his profound break from these traditions in his formulation 
of an understanding of freedom characterized by non-domination. Marshall’s view of the 
Constitution as preserving this new species of republican liberty, a conception of liberty 
he believed was uniquely suited for the nation’s growing economy, was key to the 
argument he constructed against the Court’s majority in Ogden. 
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Revisiting Ogden v. Saunders 
 Lewis Saunders was a merchant in Lexington, Kentucky who came to court 
demanding payment of a $2,200 debt arising from a contract signed by George Ogden, a 
citizen of Louisiana who lived in New York at the time of the contract was signed. Ogden 
refused to pay, claiming he was discharged from doing so by a New York bankruptcy law 
enacted in 1801. The statute allowed for prospective debtor relief, meaning once an 
insolvent debtor surrendered his or her assets, the individual was absolved from all future 
contractual obligations and free to re-enter the marketplace. Creditors were stuck with the 
bill. To some, the law provided the legislature with the ability to act quickly in the 
economic sphere in cases of emergency, allowing economic actors relief from undue 
financial hardship. To others, it represented a clear infringement of the Contract Clause, 
to say nothing of the terms of private economic arrangements. The main issue 
confronting the Court was not only whether Congress possessed the sole authority to 
enact bankruptcy laws, but also whether the New York statute was constitutional. Daniel 
Webster, representing Saunders, argued forcefully that the Constitution’s Contract Clause 
prohibited bankruptcy laws that altered the performance of existing as well as prospective 
contracts. Moreover, he claimed, the state law infringed upon the power of Congress to 
establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy throughout the United States. 
Ogden’s attorneys, led by Henry Clay, maintained that the law was a clear violation of 
the clause and arrogated to a state government a legislative power—bankruptcy law—
that belonged exclusively to Congress.  
 On March 13, 1827, the Court upheld the New York legislation as constitutional, 
arguing that the fact that the law enacted provisions governing prospective default did not 
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amount to a violation of the Commerce Clause. In general terms, the Court’s majority 
held that the bankruptcy law passed before a contract’s execution became an integral part 
of the contract itself. And it rejected the notion that bankruptcy law resided exclusively in 
Congress, arguing that in the absence of federal law, state laws governing bankruptcy 
were legal. Justice Bushrod Washington, a longtime friend of the Chief Justice, wrote for 
the majority in arguing that the Contract Clause pertained only to contracts already 
signed and in existence; legislation affecting the terms of future contracts was implicit in 
the contracts yet to be created, and thus the law hardly qualified as an impairment. 
Moreover, the Court agreed with Webster that the state legislature could lawfully enact 
bankruptcy legislation concurrently with the federal government, arguing that the 
Constitution’s grant of power to establish “uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies 
throughout the states” did not appertain exclusively to Congress. Justice William 
Johnson, in his concurrent opinion, warned against focusing too much on economic rights 
at the expense of the national welfare, declaring that “the rights of all must be held and 
enjoyed in subserviency to the good of the whole,” and the common good “must not be 
swallowed up and lost sight of while yielding attention to the claim of the creditor.”198 
 In his lone dissent on a constitutional question as Chief Justice, Marshall framed 
his argument based on what he saw as “the single question for consideration,” namely, 
“whether the act of the State of New York is consistent with or repugnant to the 
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constitution of the United States?”199 While the Court’s earlier decision in the case of 
Sturgis v. Crowinshield (1819) had struck down as unconstitutional retrospective 
bankruptcy laws freeing debtors from contracts created before the enactment of those 
laws, at issue in Ogden was whether a prospective law dictating insolvency terms in 
advance of a contract’s creation was similarly unconstitutional. Marshall disagreed 
sharply with his fellow justices on the answer to this question, arguing that the statute 
violated not only the Contract Clause but also infringed upon powers over bankruptcy 
that belonged exclusively to the Congress. But at the heart of Marshall’s dissent lay 
deeper concerns about the ramifications of Ogden: concerns related to the security of 
rights, the importance of economic responsibility among citizens, and the legacy left by 
the framers of the Constitution. 
Marshall as classical liberal 
 
 For many scholars, the classical liberal tradition was the main ideological lodestar 
for the American Revolution as well as the Constitution’s creation. With its emphasis on 
protections of private property, personal freedom, and limited government, the language 
of John Locke was not simply in the atmosphere at the time of the founding: it provided 
the air that breathed life into the Constitution itself.  Joyce Appleby, looking back to the 
American Revolution, contends that the movement toward American independence 
marked an emergence of the "ideology of liberalism," namely, "a belief in a natural 
harmony of benignly striving individuals" that replaced traditional historical theories of 
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"cycles of corruption" with "a universal law of self-interest."200 John Diggins agrees, 
pointing to American liberal thought’s self-conscious and emphatic break “from the 
paralyzing grip of the past.”201 Along similar lines, Issac Kramnick identifies “self-
centered economic productivity, not public citizenship,” as the “badge of the virtuous 
man” throughout the colonial period.202 Such interpretations would seem to confirm 
broader historical arguments that the United States has always been home to a persistent, 
even “irrational,” liberalism.203 But apart from these theories’ larger implications, on this 
much these authors agree: the early-colonial and founding periods were a time when 
abstract liberal principles found clear practical expression.   
On the subject of contract creation, Marshall struck a distinctly liberal chord. In a 
narrative redolent of John Locke, he looked back to the past, to “the rudest state of 
nature,” where “a man governs himself, and labours for his own purposes.”204 In such 
primitive circumstances, it was certain that the products one acquired through physical 
exertion were one’s own, “at least while in his possession, and he may transfer it to 
another.” Bartering and trading were rights predating society, Marshall claimed, as were 
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the informal norms of agreement and performance implied by such practices. Each 
individual possessed the fundamental right to form such agreements, as well as “the right 
to enforce” them by insisting that others “keep faith” with those agreements.205 Such 
agreements were framed with an expectation of performance, not default. As he put it, 
“they are framed with the expectation that they will be literally performed. Insolvency is 
undoubtedly a casualty which is possible, but is never expected.”206  
The contrast between such simple primeval arrangements and the complexity of state 
bankruptcy legislation could hardly have been more stark. Contracts were agreements 
drawn up by and representing the rights of “honest, fair, and just men.”207 They were not 
“a creature of society,” deriving authority from positive law.208 For, as Marshall asserted, 
“we find no allusion, from the earliest time, to any supposed act of the governing power 
giving obligation to contracts. On the contrary, the proceedings respecting them of which 
we know any thing, evince the idea of a pre-existing, intrinsic obligation.”209 The 
implication was clear: contracts may be controlled within certain limits by society, but 
they could never be a product of convention. Indeed, those who framed the Constitution 
and the Contract Clause were certainly familiar “with the writings of those wise and 
learned men, whose treatises on the laws of nature and nations have guided public 
opinion,” and those authors concurred that “contracts possess an original intrinsic 
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obligation, derived from the acts of free agents, and not given by government.”210 For 
Marshall, as for Locke, property, acquisition, trade, and commerce were all rights or 
emanations of rights preceding society and legal interference. As he concludes, it is “the 
stipulation an individual makes which binds him” to “perform what he has undertaken to 
perform,” not “some declaration of the supreme power of a State to which he belongs.”211  
It was true, Marshall conceded, that with the creation of civil society, the individual 
did not retain the enforcement power pertaining to contracts enjoyed in the state of 
nature. This right of coercion, he states, “is necessarily surrendered to government.”212 
The point was a practical one for Marshall, since “it would be incompatible with general 
peace” for each individual to retain such authority in civil society.213 This transfer 
imposed on government the important duty of furnishing a “more safe and more certain” 
legal remedy to contractual defaults. Moreover, he continued, the transfer gave 
government the right to nullify and prohibit economic agreements “deemed 
mischievous.”214 For Marshall, it was a fine but critical distinction concerning 
government power: individuals had surrendered only a punishment power to the state, not 
the authority to set legal terms to the agreements reached between private individuals.215 
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For Marshall, the legislature’s role in relation to contracts was largely remedial. Local 
governments, while “restrained from impairing the obligation of contracts,” nonetheless 
“furnish the remedy to enforce them, and administer that remedy in tribunals constituted 
by themselves.”216 While government could not negate the principle of obligation, there 
were circumstances where its officers were responsible for ensuring contractual stability. 
The Constitution, Marshall emphasized, had not made this enforcement explicit, because 
the document had treated the states “with the respect which is due to intelligent beings, 
understanding their duties, and willing to perform them; not as insane beings, who must 
be compelled to act for self-preservation. Its language is the language of restraint, not of 
coercion.”217  
While laws may regulate the right to contract, where that right is not regulated, it is 
retained in its original extent. Individuals remain free to make contracts and are not 
dependent upon government for the sanction and obligation generated by such 
agreements. Hence while government may afford remedies and pass provisions such as 
those requiring that contracts be in writing, obligation itself remained sacrosanct, an 
incidence of “that degree of free agency” that Marshall believed the laws left to every 
individual.218 The New York law, in Marshall’s view, directly threatened this liberty. He 
felt “no hesitation in saying that however law may act upon contracts, it does not enter 
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into them and become a part of the agreement.”219 Rights and the obligations that 
followed from their exercise were not produced or directed by the whims of legislative 
majorities or executive fiat, but secured by the Constitution. 
Marshall as republican 
 
 In contrast to those who identify the United States with Lockean liberalism, many 
scholars look to early America and see a distinctly republican influence. J.G.A. Pocock 
was perhaps the most systematic scholar to highlight the influence of classical republican 
thought in North America during the latter half of the eighteenth century.220 Drew McCoy 
concurred, pointing out that “the Revolutionaries … seemed obsessed with the idea that a 
republican polity required popular virtue for its stability and success.”221 Similarly, 
Bernard Bailyn argued that classical republican themes of power and corruption were 
prominent concerns at the time of the Constitution’s ratification.222 Even after the 
Constitution’s ratification, Lance Banning argues, classical republican ideas remained 
prominent in the vocabulary of many Americans throughout the 1790s.223  
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Marshall’s classical republican sympathies emphasized the duty citizens owed 
each other, and those economic obligations that applied equally to all persons, regardless 
of background, wealth, or social standing. Once an agreement was entered, the fulfillment 
of its terms was irrevocable. This responsibility, generated “by the act of the parties,” 
harkened back to those basic treatises on the law of obligation and contract that had been 
the basis of America’s legal system.224 In these works, Marshall claimed, one found 
general agreement “that contracts possess an intrinsic obligation, derived from the acts of 
free agents, and not given by government.”225 The bond created by economic 
agreements—“the duty of keeping faith between … parties and the right to enforce it if 
violated”—entailed an obligation toward others that was carried by individuals into 
society, one that was neither created nor removable by political officers.226 Legislative 
attempts to modify this pre-political duty risked not only disrupting economic stability, 
but undermining a fundamental commitment incumbent upon all citizens.   
Despite Marshall’s emphasis on the minimal role of government in matters of 
contract, he nonetheless stressed that legislators maintained a narrow but important 
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intermediary function. Affording legal remedies was one such responsibility. Instituting 
“statutes of frauds, of usury, and of limitations” were among other duties.227 These 
exercises of “the external action of law upon contracts” constituted “the usual exercise of 
legislative power,” one that refrained from “introducing conditions into them not agreed 
to by the parties.”228 It was the solemn duty of political officials to address such 
aberrations in commercial exchange, and the “high sense of duty which men selected for 
the government of their fellow citizens must be supposed to feel” should furnish a guard 
“against a course of legislation which must end in self-destruction” for the country.229 
The “solemn oath taken by every member to support the constitution of the United 
States,” he warned, prohibited “intentional attempts to violate its spirit while evading its 
letter.” Thus, to provide a legal remedy, “a delicate and important duty,” was one of the 
foremost responsibilities of elected officials.230 Indeed, the failure to uphold the 
Constitution and afford a remedy to injured parties would be calamitous from an 
economic standpoint. Worse, dereliction of this “high duty” would subject “the 
government to the just reproach of the world.”231 For Marshall, contractual obligation and 
law were complementary, not identical. As he put it, the two “originate at different times 
and are derived from different sources.”  
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Thus there were limits to the Constitution’s legal coercion. Consistent with his 
belief that the law left a considerable zone of free agency to every individual, Marshall 
argued that the Court could not legally enforce all aspects of a contract. Some dimension 
of obligation must be left to citizens. For him, there existed a basic trust that parties 
entered into when drawing up a contract that could not be remedied or enforced. This 
moral dimension of a contract, Marshall conceded, ultimately depended upon the 
relationships among citizens, not legal means, for its observance. As he put it, “all admit 
that the Constitution refers to and preserves the legal, not the moral, obligation of a 
contract.”232 The continuity of economic arrangements was built upon the informal 
relationships created by citizens, those that were “enforced by the operation of internal 
and invisible agents, not by the agency of human laws.”233 Notwithstanding his 
unwavering veneration of the Constitution, Marshall recognized that the there remained a 
realm of public life separate from legal interference and coercion, an area characterized 
by the willingness of citizens to keep their word with each another. Ultimately, a 
prosperous economy depended as much on the level of trust that obtained among the 
marketplace’s participants as it did on the principle of profit-maximization.   
Marshall’s neo-republicanism 
While liberal and republican ideas may have been the most prominent source of 
ideas in early American political culture, it is important to remember that, like much else, 
these concepts were also undergoing definitional change. As John Gunnell concludes, 
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"the much contested issue of the philosophy of the founding" is best resolved by 
discarding "the fundamental premise ... that there was a distinct, or dominant, 
philosophy."234 Throughout the eighteenth century, as John Murrin notes, North America 
was “experiencing a transition from a premodern to a modern social order," and 
traditional understandings of republicanism were not exempt from this transformation.235 
In this vein, many scholars have identified during these years the emergence of a new 
“commercial republicanism,” a theory that wedded classical liberalism’s emphasis on 
private interest to republican concerns for the common welfare.236 On these accounts, 
thinkers as diverse as Adam Smith, Montesquieu, Benjamin Franklin, and Alexis de 
Tocqueville held to a common conviction that a society based on the interdependence 
fostered by commercial exchanges would offer “a more sensible and realizable 
alternative” to ancient republics that were sustained by a small, homogenous population 
governed by civic virtue or divine law.237 More recently, scholars such as Quentin 
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Skinner and Philip Pettit have endeavored to formulate a similar theory of republican 
liberty, characterized by individual enjoyment of “non-domination.” Historically, Skinner 
contends, “unfree” states are those that are either ruled tyrannically or where an 
individual’s “capacity for action” is “dependent upon the will of anyone other than the 
body of its own citizens.”238 By contrast, Skinner and Pettit have developed a theory of 
“neo-republicanism” defined by an individual being placed “in a position where no one 
can interfere arbitrarily in your affairs.” 239 In practical terms, Pettit argues, such liberty is 
secured by institutions and laws that erect legal barriers against the domination of one 
citizen’s liberty by another. These arrangements, he continues, have paved the way for a 
“newer republicanism,” one with “a juridical cast in which a central place was given to 
the notion of rights—customary, legal, and constitutional rights—as bulwarks against 
absolute power.” 240 For these neo-republicans, theorizing liberty as freedom from 
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political domination complements and enriches republicanism’s historical emphasis on 
the common good. 
 Marshall likewise feared political domination, and saw it proceeding directly from 
the halls of the state legislatures. The changes wrought by the New York legislature went 
to the heart of individual liberty in the economic realm. He was careful to emphasize that 
while state law may legitimately regulate market manipulation, the law’s stipulations 
must not go so far as to become a “constituent” part of contract.241 Legislative acts 
imposing stipulations that were not contemplated by either contracting party represented 
“a very unusual and a very extraordinary exercise of the legislative power,” an 
encroachment that “ought not to be gratuitously attributed to laws that do not profess to 
claim it.”242 The legislature’s ability to invade the right to contract could not be ceded 
lightly, Marshall believed, for once a law became an intrinsic part of “all subsequent 
contracts,” nothing could halt state government’s ability to regulate the terms of any and 
all economic agreements.243 There was no turning back: Marshall feared that tolerating 
partial legislative control over contracts in Ogden could very well lead to total control 
over contracts. Conceivably, he speculated, a future law might decide that “all contracts 
should be subject to legislative control” and could be discharged only in such manner as 
the legislature prescribed. It would be far safer to allow the “act of the parties,” not “the 
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interference of the legislature,” to define the scope and contingencies of commercial 
agreements. By assuming for itself “the power of changing the relative situation of debtor 
and creditor, of interfering with contracts,” the legislature had assumed for itself authority 
over those commercial relationships that went “home to every man, touches the interest 
of all, and controls the conduct of every individual in those things which he supposes to 
be proper for his own exclusive management.”244 No individual, Marshall believed, could 
be free so long as this power loomed over economic affairs. 
 Like fellow Federalist James Madison, Marshall also feared the invasion of 
liberties by majorities or minorities, democratically elected or otherwise. The New York 
law rested its authority on just such a majority, not the law of the Constitution. The fact 
that the Court’s majority had legitimized the law against the Constitution’s commerce 
clause was a canary in the coal mine, signaling a growing transition of political authority 
away from the rule of law and toward the will of elected officials. After all, imposing 
“restraints” on legislation concerning contracts “was thought necessary by all those 
patriots who could take an enlightened and comprehensive view” of the Articles of 
Confederation.245 Siding with the legislature against the Constitution meant siding with 
the passions of the moment, and not with the careful deliberations of the constitutional 
convention. This was a precarious foundation indeed upon which to build political 
authority. The states were unpredictable, their policies typically guided by neither caution 
nor prudence. Open the door to some legislative meddling in contractual negotiations, 
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Marshall warned, and very soon restrictions would be imposed for no other reason save 
that “the legislature has so enacted” them.246 In effect, the law bestowed “a high 
prerogative indeed” upon the legislature “to decide that one enactment shall enter the 
contract,” while others may “be excluded from it.” Allowing the legislature such broad 
authority rendered the terms of economic arrangements, to say nothing of the nation’s 
economy, highly uncertain and thereby unstable. 
The significance of Ogden thus went beyond the arcane subject of contract law. 
According to Marshall, the New York law would imperil the civic health of the nation 
that had been rehabilitated by the Constitution’s ratification in 1788. Pointing out that 
state interference with private contracts was a chief “mischief” afflicting the country 
under the Articles of Confederation, he recalled that legislative tampering was taken “to 
such an excess” by the state governments as to “break in upon the ordinary intercourse of 
society.”247 The “ordinary intercourse” of the nation included much more than economic 
relations. At a fundamental level, Marshall declared, “confidence between man and man” 
was also eroded by such legislation. Indeed, more than “the existence of credit” and “the 
sanctity of private faith,” very “morals of the people” were threatened by political 
meddling. Certainly the Court’s ruling would render the “great principle” of contractual 
sanctity, “one of the most important features in the constitution of the United States,” 
entirely “useless.” But of even worse consequence, the Court would effectively cast aside 
a clause “which the state of the times most urgently required, one on which the good and 
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the wise reposed confidently for securing the prosperity and harmony of our citizens.”248 
Concerned as he was with the economic impact of Ogden, Marshall was just as troubled 
by the civic consequences of the Court’s decision. 
 The most effective curb to political domination rested in the Constitution. The 
Constitution provided the legal structure and protections necessary to thwart the will of 
the elected branches of government. It was beyond doubt, he wrote, that the Constitution 
recognized that the “great mass of human transactions” arose informally among 
individuals.249 Such agreements originated and “grew out of the acts of the parties,” not 
government, and those agreements usually included whatever “stipulations, which, as 
honest, fair, and just men, they ought to have made.” The framers of the Constitution 
appreciated the informal character of these agreements and understood that the very 
“nature of our Union” was intended “in a great measure” to make Americans a single 
people with respect to their commercial relations, and that “so far as respects the 
intercommunication of individuals … the lines of separation between States are, in many 
respects, obliterated.”250 Perceiving this destination on the horizon, the framers drafted a 
document that would facilitate rather than frustrate the nation’s commercial progress. The 
document was a plan for the future, not a legal code to remedy short-term problems. It 
spoke in “general terms comprehending a whole subject,” especially regarding economic 
matters.251 The meaning of its Contract Clause was absolute, unequivocal, and final: “No 
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State,” it declared, “shall…pass any…Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” The 
implication was that the Constitution instituted a legal order leaving to each citizen “the 
conduct … in those things which he supposes to be proper for his own exclusive 
management.”252 Thus the document’s language contemplated “restraint as to the 
obligation of contracts,” not a determined “hostility to invade the inviolability of contract, 
which is placed beyond its reach.”253 Its words treat citizens and the state governments 
with a language of respect, as befitting “intelligent beings understanding their duties and 
willing to perform them; not as insane beings who must be compelled to act for self-
preservation.” In brief, the Constitution advanced an ideal of freedom in which citizens 
were given a wide berth to deliberate, plan, set terms, and see to conclusion the 
agreements they reached with one another. More than national political officials, the state 
governments, or even the judiciary, it was the Constitution that provided to the American 
people an escape from political domination. 
 Consistent with neo-republican theories, Marshall’s dissent called attention to the 
dangers posed by political domination and the necessity of a legal framework to guard 
against them. The New York statute set a grave standard for future actions the elected 
branches of government could take in the economic realm. Ever the realist, Marshall 
warned that liberty was imperiled no longer by foreign enemies alone, but from threats 
issuing from domestic forces as well. Instituting effective barriers against the latter “evil” 
had been the mission of those truly virtuous and wise statesman at the time of the 
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framing, he reminded his readers, and was “one of the important benefits expected” from 
their new Constitution.254 Thus in Ogden, Marshall appealed to a constitutional 
republicanism, one that valued the classical emphasis on duty but recognized that 
alleviating the threat of political domination depended ultimately on the existence of a 
stable legal order. 
Conclusion 
 
 For Marshall, Ogden v. Saunders was about themes of political theory that rose 
above bankruptcy law, contractual performance, or even the more typical questions the 
Supreme Court confronted concerning federal versus state sovereignty. On a larger scale, 
the case affected society “deeply and seriously,” revolving around fundamental tensions 
involving economic versus political authority, individual rights and the claims of 
community.255 While Marshall was clearly disturbed by the economic consequences of 
New York’s newfound influence over commercial affairs, something greater than a 
hardboiled libertarian ideology characterized his dissent in the case. Indeed, by this point 
in his tenure, a number of Marshall’s core beliefs were under fire. Liberties were in 
jeopardy. Republican virtues of duty and obligation were also at stake. And looming on 
the national horizon was the prospect of uncontrolled state legislatures, possessing the 
imprimatur of the Court to exercise hitherto unprecedented power over their constituents’ 
affairs. In contrast to those who would emphasize above all else either Marshall’s 
liberalism or republican commitments, Ogden attests to Marshall’s sympathies for both 
traditions.  
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 Greater consideration of Ogden is therefore warranted to fully appreciate 
Marshall’s political thought. His dissent in the case is much more than an oddity or piece 
of trivia, the rare occasion when Marshall departed from the consensus and unity he 
sought so diligently to build as Chief Justice. Moreover, the dissent is more than another 
example of his longstanding distrust of the state legislatures. Marshall invoked the 
language of natural rights as well as that of duty and obligation to build his argument 
against the majority opinion. But despite his support for elements of both theories, he 
does not limit himself to these two frameworks. Rather, he raises an alternative account 
of republicanism based on non-domination, one he saw as incorporating the best aspects 
of liberalism and republicanism. Marshall’s neo-republicanism celebrated individual 
rights alongside the responsibilities toward one’s fellow citizens that accompanied their 
exercise. Without the institutions provided by the rule of law, however, neither liberal 
rights nor republican duty could be secure.  
 Thus it is fitting that the Constitution itself was the keystone of Marshall’s 
argument. Set aside the passions of the moment, he insisted, and look to “the mind of the 
convention” when interpreting the Constitution.256 “Look back to the history of the 
times” and “the august spectacle” of the state ratifying conventions, he urged.257 
Remember and do justice to those who had taken a truly “enlightened and comprehensive 
view of our situation.” Ever mindful of the fragility of constitutional government in 
America, even a seemingly mundane bankruptcy suit like Ogden stoked Marshall’s 
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apprehensions. While drawing upon the influence of classical liberal and republican 
principles for understanding contractual obligation, Marshall pressed beyond these 
traditions to recognize the Constitution’s function in unifying the American people 
against political domination. In Ogden, one sees Marshall as not only a legal thinker. Nor 
is he merely a liberal or republican theorist. At the center of these often competing 
theories, and at the center of his lifetime of public service, was the Constitution.   
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Conclusions: The Legacy of Marshall’s Constitutionalism 
  Despite his place at the summit of American legal and constitutional history, John 
Marshall’s political thought has long been shrouded in ambiguity. Marshall is most 
famous for his constitutional opinions, and his thinking typically circumscribed to the 
Supreme Court. But like the man himself, his arguments are much more wide ranging and 
deliberate—indeed, much more philosophical—than they appear at first glance. His 
constitutionalism contained political dimensions that belie accounts that conceive 
Marshall’s thought in the bloodless language of law alone. Furthermore, those accounts 
that do take seriously Marshall’s political thought typically take matters too far: he was 
neither an uncritical liberal theorist nor a devotee of the Federalist Party. A full 
appreciation of Marshall as a political thinker must be all-encompassing enough to 
include his abstract philosophical convictions as well as his practical assessment of the 
Constitution’s influence in the fledgling United States.  
 By revisiting some of the most important of Marshall’s opinions, we gain better 
insight into his vision of what values the new nation should impress upon its citizens in 
its early years. As the nation’s third Chief Justice, Marshall was in the thick of the 
difficult task of legitimizing a nation to a people whose identification and sense of 
citizenship had hitherto stopped at the shores of state boundaries. Such acclimation was 
by necessity gradual work, and forced Marshall to continually probe the question of what 
constitutional obligation, sovereignty, and citizenship required. Turning to John 
 111 
 
Marshall’s corpus reminds us that the role of the constitutional government—its content, 
scope, proper jurisdictions, and responsibilities—was publicly re-thought and contested 
even in the earliest years of the new republic. While no anti-Constitution party emerged 
after 1787, the function of the instrument was ambiguous. Well into the 1800s, it was up 
to political figures to elevate its status in national affairs.  
 Marbury v. Madison represents perhaps Marshall’s most serious engagement with 
the notion of constitutional legitimacy. More than a case dealing with judicial review, 
Marshall invokes the Constitution’s protection of liberties, its embodiment of popular 
sovereignty, and its ability to provide legal focal points for the nation as bases for its 
binding authority. But of even greater significance in Marbury is Marshall’s theory of the 
document’s moral legitimacy. In McCulloch v. Maryland, Marshall draws a line between 
national and state authority in striking down a state law taxing a federal institution. But in 
the opinion and in his public commentary following the verdict, Marshall emphasizes the 
sovereignty of the Constitution as controlling legislation passed by the national as well as 
state governments. Finally, in his dissent in Ogden v. Saunders, he used the occasion of a 
state law concerning bankruptcy to articulate a neo-republican understanding of liberty 
based on political non-domination, a type of freedom he believed could only be secured 
by the Constitution.   
 What unites the different threads of these arguments is Marshall’s commitment to 
the absolute supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law. Under its rule, seemingly 
contradictory notions of popular sovereignty and rights, federalism and nationalism, and 
liberalism and republicanism are mutually reinforcing for Marshall. While Marshall 
acknowledged other stakes in such debates, they were less important for him than loyalty 
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to the Constitution. But his was never an unthinking devotion. Instead, his writing 
consistently forces readers to reflect on the sufficiency of the political categories raised in 
a given case, as his arguments in support of the Constitution proceed by way of careful 
exposition. Thus Marshall’s political thought approximates most closely those 
philosophies that see a role for the Constitution in knitting together disparate people as an 
alternative to traditional national identities held together by no stronger bonds than blood 
and soil. As William Booth puts it, “citizenship of the constitutional-patriotic sort stands 
midway between … national membership of the kind in which the boundary markers are 
… exclusionary, nonpolitical attributes, and the nomadic world of itinerants and their 
neighborhoods.”258  
 In his later years on the Court, Marshall’s optimism toward a union based on 
loyalty to the Constitution declined. By the 1830s, tensions between the states and the 
national government were rapidly reaching a breaking point. Partisanship was at an all-
time high. And the unanimity Marshall had worked so hard to achieve as Chief Justice 
was dissolving before his eyes as Democrat-Republican judges were appointed to the 
bench. States rights’ theories were becoming ever more popular, as was skepticism 
toward the national government. The nation was headed into uncharted waters, Marshall 
believed, and it was not clear the Constitution could guide the American people 
through—that is, if the people even wished for its guidance. By the time his tenure on the 
Court was drawing to a close in 1832, he gloomily predicted to close friend and colleague 
Joseph Story that “the union has been preserved thus far by miracles, and that cannot 
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continue.”259 With the nation on the cusp of the Civil War, one cannot fault his 
prediction. When Marshall died in Philadelphia in 1835, he believed his lifelong efforts 
to build a national identity based on the Constitution had ended in failure. 
 Marshall would likely find much to lament in our political climate. He would 
regret the fractured state of American politics today, and deplore the political divisions 
that have come to characterize the decisions of the modern Supreme Court. But at least 
one feature of American politics would meet his approval: the enduring salience of the 
Constitution in American political discourse. “Powerful and ingenious minds,” he warned 
in Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), would try their hardest to convince individuals “through 
refined and metaphysical reasoning” that the Constitution was “a magnificent structure, 
indeed, to look at, but totally unfit for use.”260 On this score, at least, it would come as 
some surprise to Marshall that the Constitution’s enemies lost, and that the document he 
defended, after overcoming significant obstacles, has endured. Ever mindful of its 
tendency to come under fire, however, he would continue to point to the Constitution as 
an authority for national policy as well as a source of unity—perhaps the only source of 
unity—at a time of ongoing partisan strife and rancor. His political thought introduces us 
as readers, as students ourselves of the Constitution, to the fundamental and enduring 
importance of the rule of law for citizens today. 
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